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Breaking bad news is a difficult, yet unavoidable part of healthcare for physicians
and patients alike. Although expert opinion suggests that certain strategies for breaking
bad news may be better than others, there is little methodologically rigorous research to
support current guidelines. This study used an experimental paradigm to test two
communication strategies, forecasting bad news and framing prognostic information,
when giving people a life-limiting diagnosis of colon cancer. Videotapes depicted a
physician disclosing a diagnosis of cancer and discussing prognosis. Participants (N =
128) were asked to imagine they were going to see a doctor for physical symptoms they
had been experiencing and were randomly assigned to one of one of four videotape
conditions: (a) bad news warning (i.e., “I’m afraid I have bad news.”), positive outcome
framing (e.g., chances of survival); (b) no warning, positive outcome framing; (c) bad
news warning, negative outcome (e.g., chances of death) framing; or (d) no warning,
negative outcome framing. Results showed that the type of warning recommended in
current guidelines (and examined in this study) was not associated with lower
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psychological distress (i.e., anxiety, affect), nor did it improve recall of consultation
content. In contrast, individuals who heard a positively framed prognosis were
significantly less anxious and had lower negative affect than those who heard a
negatively framed prognosis. They rated their prognosis as significantly better than those
who heard the negative frame and were significantly more hopeful. Despite these
desirable outcomes, a trend toward reduced accuracy in recalling the prognostic statistics
was observed in the positive condition. Because the goal of a prognostic discussion is
generally to balance accurate knowledge with optimal psychological well-being, these
findings suggest indirectly that mixed framing (i.e., explaining prognosis with both
positive and negative frames) may be best, although further research is needed. The
results from this study contribute to a growing body of literature exploring optimal
approaches for communicating bad news in health care. Though individual differences
preclude a one-size-fits-all approach, this empirical evidence should help doctors to
communicate bad news in ways that enhance understanding while minimizing distress for
each patient.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW
Breaking bad news, such as disclosing an alarming diagnosis or conveying poor
prognosis, is reported to be one of the most difficult communication tasks faced by health
care professionals (Hagerty, Butow, Ellis, Dimitry, & Tattersall, 2005). Many physicians
describe this task as stressful, and patients relate experiences of receiving bad news from
physicians whose approach was insensitive or inadequate (Butow et al., 1996; Christakis,
1999; Friedrichsen & Milberg, 2006). Numerous guidelines have been discussed in
journal articles, editorials, and formal protocols in an effort to help physicians carry out
these difficult conversations; however, these guidelines and recommendations tend to
highlight only general communication strategies and are based largely on expert
consensus (Baile et al., 2000). For example, guidelines often encourage physicians to
forecast impending bad news with a warning, that is, a statement such as “I do not have
good news.” Though it is suggested that this type of warning may soften the blow and
improve the patient’s understanding, there is not yet research to support this claim.
Furthermore, these general guidelines rarely offer recommendations for how to
discuss topics that are particularly difficult for physicians, such as disclosing poor
prognosis to patients. It is debated, for instance, whether it is more beneficial to frame a
prognosis in terms of positive outcomes (e.g., “You have a 30% chance of survival”) or
negative outcomes (e.g., “You have a 70% chance of death”; Rodriguez, Gambino,
Butow, Hagerty, & Arnold, 2008). Discerning whether physicians’ framing of prognosis
might influence patients’ recall and interpretation is critical (Gordon & Daughtery, 2003;
Rodriguez et al., 2008), as research shows that patients tend to overestimate (i.e., are
more positive about) their own prognosis (Mackillop, Stewart, Ginsburg, & Stewart,
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1988). Moreover, these misjudgments tend to be associated with seeking more aggressive
treatment compared with patients with more realistic understandings of their prognosis
(Weeks et al., 1998).
In short, although expert opinion suggests that certain approaches to breaking bad
news may be better than others, there is a dearth of methodologically rigorous
investigations to support current guidelines. Little is known about “which of the personal,
interpersonal, news-specific, situation-specific, and transmission-specific variables” may
contribute to patients’ recall, interpretation and response to bad news (Ptacek & Eberhart,
1996, p. 496).
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the effect of forecasting bad news
and framing prognostic information when people receive a life-limiting diagnosis. The
study had the following specific aims:
1. Determine whether forecasting bad news affects psychological distress and
information recall in analog patients receiving a hypothetical cancer diagnosis.
2. Determine whether the framing of the prognosis (positive outcome vs. negative
outcome) influences psychological distress, recall, and interpretations of
prognosis and feelings of hope in analog patients.
3. Determine whether analog patient characteristics (e.g., personality, age,
education, health information style) interact with warning and framing to
influence analog patient outcomes.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
Research on patient-physician communication has a relatively long history in the
social, behavioral, and medical sciences. Research on breaking bad news, however, is
limited. According to one review, fewer than 25% of publications on breaking bad news
present original data (VandeKieft, 2001), and empirical data that are available tend to be
based primarily on retrospective investigations and self-report studies of physician
opinion and patient preferences (Ptacek & Eberhart, 1996). The literature reviewed in this
chapter will focus primarily on studies of cancer patients, as the majority of research and
discussion on breaking bad news has been conducted within oncology.
The first section of this review defines bad news and provides a general overview
of the two forms of bad news that are examined in this study: diagnosis and prognosis.
This is followed by evidence suggesting that patients often have high levels of distress
and poor understanding of what they have heard after receiving bad news, varying with
particular aspects of physician communication. Research on patients’ preferences and
physicians’ perspectives on bad news delivery is then reviewed. A general discussion of
practice guidelines is included next, followed by a more detailed discussion of two
communication strategies: warning of impending bad news and framing prognostic
information in terms of positive versus negative outcomes. This chapter concludes with a
discussion of the limitations of prior studies and the associated need for controlled
experimental studies to explore whether particular communication strategies can enhance
patient recall and understanding while minimizing distress.
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Bad News Defined: The Importance of Diagnosis and Prognosis
In healthcare, bad news is a phrase that is used liberally to describe any
information that “results in a cognitive, behavioral or emotional deficit in the person
receiving the news that persists for some time after the news is received” (Ptacek &
Eberhardt, 1996, p. 496). This definition implies that, ultimately, the interpretation of bad
news is subjective and may vary according to an individual patient’s personality and past
experiences (Fallowfield & Jenkins, 2004). Another commonly cited definition describes
bad news as “any news that drastically and negatively alters the patient’s view of his or
her future” (Buckman, 1984, p. 1597). Most communication research has focused on bad
news in the form of disclosing a diagnosis such as Alzheimer’s disease or cancer;
however, bad news may range from telling a patient that he needs to take medication for
high cholesterol to telling family members that a patient has died. Conveying poor
prognosis, that is, telling a patient that a cure is unlikely or that he does not have long to
live, is reported to be an especially challenging communication task (Schofield & Butow,
2004).
Though sometimes assumed to be synonymous with life expectancy, prognosis
generally refers to the predicted course and outcome of a disease. Prognosis considers
both disease-related and treatment-related information including the spread of the
disease, the chance of a cure, 5- or 10-year survival rates, qualitative expectations of
disease progression, and differences in morbidity and mortality with and without
treatment (Rodriguez et al., 2008). Some researchers distinguish between qualitative
prognosis (i.e., the patient is/is not expected to die from this disease) and quantitative
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prognosis (i.e., how long the patient is expected to live; Kaplowitz, Campo, & Chiu,
2002).
Although difficult for physicians to communicate and for patients to hear, bad
news is an unavoidable part of healthcare. Ethical and legal standards in Western cultures
encourage patients to be involved in medical decision-making, and emphasis is placed on
the patient’s own preferences for treatment and care. As such, patients need to understand
both their diagnosis and prognosis, even when that information is bad, in order to make
informed decisions according to their preferences and values. Indeed, studies have shown
that how patients understand their diagnosis and estimate their prognosis is related to
what treatments they choose to pursue (Weeks et al., 1998).
Challenges of Bad News Communication
Psychological Distress
In spite of the inherently subjective nature of bad news, receiving a diagnosis of
cancer, particularly one with poor prognosis, can be expected to incite some level of fear
and distress. A certain amount of anxiety is normal in response to a diagnosis of cancer,
yet many patients experience more severe, clinically significant psychological distress
that can interfere with their quality of life and ability to manage and cope with the disease
(Schofield & Butow, 2004). For instance, a large study of approximately 4,500 patients
with newly diagnosed cancer found that 18% had clinically significant levels of
depression and 24% had clinically significant levels of anxiety as assessed with the Brief
Symptom Inventory (Zabora, Brintzenhofeszoc, Curbow, Hooker, & Piantadosi, 2001).
A smaller study of women with ovarian cancer reported similar findings, with
35% of patients evidencing mild to moderate depressive symptoms and 20% showing
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moderate to severe depression using the Beck Depression Inventory (Norton et al., 2004).
Notably, one investigation found that the level of mood disturbance shortly after lung
cancer diagnosis (before beginning treatment) was the strongest predictor of mood
disturbance 6 months later, even after controlling for patient characteristics such as
coping style and response to treatment (Akechi et al., 2006). Although the authors of that
investigation did not control for prediagnosis mood, this preliminary evidence suggests
that steps taken to minimize anxiety and depression early in the healthcare encounter may
be important for minimizing longer term psychological distress. Only limited research,
however, has examined the extent to which facets of physician communication contribute
to patients’ anxiety and depression following bad news.
One such study found that breast cancer patients’ psychological adjustment 6
months after surgery was significantly associated with patients’ recall of their physician
having a caring and empathic attitude when communicating the cancer diagnosis
(Roberts, Cox, Reintgen, Baile, & Gibertini, 1994). Other studies have reported similar
results (e.g., Butow et al., 1996; Omne-Ponten, Holmber, & Sjoden, 1994). In addition, a
survey of patients with gynecologic cancer found that patients who were anxious and/or
depressed were more likely to report that their physicians had held back information
when communicating the diagnosis compared with patients without anxiety or
depression. Anxiety was also associated with a greater need for emotional support at the
time of the diagnosis, and women who were depressed were more likely to report feeling
dissatisfied with the doctor-patient relationship (Paraskevaidis, Kitchener, & Walker,
1993).
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Another retrospective study of recently diagnosed melanoma patients found that
among other communication factors, patients who reported that their doctors discussed
the severity of the cancer and those who recalled their doctor talking about life
expectancy reported lower levels of depression approximately 3 to 4 months after
receiving a cancer diagnosis (Schofield et al., 2003). These differences, however, did not
persist when patients were assessed again 3 to 4 months later. All of these studies provide
preliminary evidence of an association between patients’ perceptions of physician
communication and patients’ postdiagnosis adjustment; however, conclusions are limited
by the studies’ retrospective designs and imprecise characterization of physicians’
communication behaviors.
Patient Comprehension
In addition to minimizing psychological distress, maximizing patient recall and
comprehension of diagnostic and prognostic information is an important goal in the
delivery of bad news. As stated previously, patients need to understand the novel and
often complicated medical information provided by their physician if they are to
participate in decision-making about their own care (Schofield & Butow, 2004).
Unfortunately, prior research has suggested that patients may not achieve adequate
understanding. For instance, a study of patients’ recall following an initial appointment
with their oncologist found that patients remembered only 25% of the information
presented and only 45% of the information classified by oncologists as most important
(Dunn et al., 1993). Another investigation of cancer outpatients reported that nearly 30%
misunderstood the extent of their disease (i.e., whether it was localized or metastatic) and
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40% could not correctly identify the goal of the treatment they were receiving (i.e.,
curative vs. palliative; Gattellari, Butow, Tattersall, Dunn, & MacLeod, 1999).
Patient comprehension regarding prognosis appears to be particularly poor
(Gattellari et al., 1999; Mackillop et al., 1988; Weeks et al., 1998). To illustrate, in the
large-scale SUPPORT study (the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for
Outcomes and Risks of Treatments), patients with advanced lung and colon cancer and
their treating physicians were asked to estimate the patient’s chances of surviving 6
months (Weeks et al., 1998). Response options were less than 10%, approximately 25%,
50%, 75%, or 90% or greater. Results revealed that patients tended to overestimate their
chances of survival compared with physician estimates, as well as their actual duration of
survival. For instance, three-quarters of patients with a less than 10% chance of surviving
6 months erroneously estimated their chances of survival to be 75% or more. Similar
discrepancies were seen for patients with higher 6-month survival rates; overall, 82% of
patients overestimated their chances of survival compared with their physician, and 59%
did so by 2 or more prognostic response categories.
These discrepancies are concerning for two reasons: first, patients were
significantly less accurate than physicians in predicting actual 6-month survival; second,
patient estimates of prognosis were significantly associated with treatment preferences.
Specifically, among patients with a less than 10% chance of surviving 6 months
according to their physician, those patients who believed they had a 90% or greater
chance of surviving 6 months were 8.5 times more likely to choose life-extending
treatment at the expense of pain and discomfort compared with patients who estimated
their 6-month survival probabilities at less than 90% (Weeks et al., 1998).
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In sum, many patients appear to have a poor understanding of their own disease
and prognosis, and these misinterpretations have important implications for treatment
preferences. Patients who considerably overestimate their prognosis may choose more
aggressive treatments without appreciation that such treatments may produce painful side
effects without significantly lengthening their lives (Lamont & Christakis, 2001). These
findings do not appear to be unique to patients close to death, as a similar tendency to
overestimate prognosis and misinterpret treatment goals has been documented in
outpatients with less advanced stages of cancer (Gattellari et al., 1999).
Common sense suggests that numerous factors likely contribute to these
misunderstandings. Although patient intellect, personality, and denial likely play a role, it
is reasonable to believe that the manner in which physicians communicate may be
relevant, even after controlling for patient characteristics (Christakis, 1999; Sabbioni,
1999). For instance, one study found that patients’ retrospective ratings of the clarity of
information received were associated with better recall (Gattellari et al., 1999), yet this
finding clearly confounds patients’ ratings with their recall. More research is needed to
elucidate the association between physician communication and patient recall and
interpretation of prognostic information.
Patient Preferences
Patients repeatedly identify good doctor-patient communication as an essential
element in quality healthcare (Butow, Dunn, & Tattersall, 1995). A recent survey of 440
patients with advanced cancer, COPD, and heart disease showed that more than 98% of
these patients cited open and honest communication with their physician as very or
extremely important to their care. Communication was the third most important element
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of quality end-of-life care, even more important than relief of symptoms, being treated as
an individual, and 23 other aspects of care (Heyland et al., 2006). Communication
appears to be equally important to patients with less advanced disease. A survey of 232
outpatients with cancer found that 99% of patients cited communication skills as a very
or moderately important aspect of care, though the study did not clarify which skills were
considered most important (Wiggers, Donovan, Redman, & Sanson-Fisher, 1990).
Moreover, a recent qualitative study of cancer patients’ perspectives found that many
patients believed that communication with their physician could influence important
cancer outcomes, most notably their survival, by virtue of its effect on decision-making,
immune functioning, and attitude as well as their emotional distress, sense of control, and
feelings of hope (Thorne, Hislop, Armstrong, & Oglov, 2008).
Though overshadowed by studies of physician opinion until recently, several
researchers have attempted to discern what information patients want when receiving bad
news. Despite some variability according to patients’ age, education, and disease stage, a
recent review of the literature concluded that the majority of patients “want as much
information as possible” regarding topics ranging from diagnosis to treatment and
prognosis (Barclay, Blackhall, & Tulsky, 2007, p. 961). More specifically, one study of
cancer patients’ preferences found that patients placed the highest priority on receiving
information regarding their disease and their treatment options, above elements such as
being comforted, reassured, or talking about their feelings regarding the news (Parker et
al., 2001).
With respect to prognosis, one survey of women with early-stage breast cancer
found that over 90% of women considered it very important to know their chances of
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being cured, their chances of the recommended treatment working, and the disease
characteristics affecting their probability of cure (e.g., tumor size, lymph node
involvement). Sixty percent of women reported it was very important to know 10-year
survival rates for women taking the recommended therapy; only 30% wanted to know
maximum and minimum life expectancy figures (Lobb, Butow, Kenny, & Tattersall,
1999). A similar study revealed that 91% of women with newly diagnosed breast cancer
wanted to know prognostic information before making treatment decisions (Lobb, Kenny,
Butow, & Tattersall, 2001). These preferences do not appear to change considerably in
more advanced disease stages; 80 to 85% of patients with incurable metastatic cancer
reported a desire to be given information about survival rates (Hagerty et al., 2004).
Notably, however, in contrast to diagnostic and treatment-related information, some
patients expressed a desire that their physicians inquire first before disclosing prognostic
information (Hagerty et al., 2004).
Although most patients reportedly want to be fully informed of their condition,
this desire for information does not come without qualifications. For example, patients
consistently report wanting to receive bad news in a way that is honest and
straightforward but does not destroy their hope. Similarly, “being too blunt” is commonly
cited as a characteristic of poorly delivered bad news (Wenrich et al., 2001.) Patients
have generally reported wanting their doctors to be empathic and supportive (Butow,
MacLean, Dunn, Tattersall, & Boyer, 1997; Parker et al., 2001), to use simple language,
and to allow plenty of time for questions (Parker et al., 2001).
Parker and colleagues (2001, p. 2051) found that “doctor warning me that there
will be unfavorable news” was considered by patients to be an important, though not
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essential element for delivering bad news. This technique was rated as somewhat less
important than other aspects of communication such as being told of all treatment
options, being given the news directly and honestly, and having the doctor take time to
answer questions. Another study found similarly that 77% of breast cancer patients
considered “[preparing patients] for the possibility of bad news as early as possible” to be
among the top 10 most important principles for delivering bad news (Girgis, SansonFisher, & Schofield, 1999, Table 1). It remains unclear how patients define preparation or
what time frame may be considered as early as possible.
Somewhat less is known about how patients prefer to hear prognostic information.
Davey and colleagues conducted semistructured interviews with 26 cancer patients and
found that all patients preferred that physicians frame prognostic information in terms of
positive outcomes (Davey, Butow, & Armstrong, 2003). In contrast, Lobb et al. (1999)
found mixed results: 43% of women with breast cancer preferred to hear prognosis
framed in terms of positive outcomes (e.g., chance of cure) because it “encourages
determination to manage treatment positively,” whereas 33% preferred the prognosis
framed in terms of negative outcomes (e.g., chance of relapse) because it “emphasizes the
importance of additional treatment” and was considered “more specific/precise” (p. 294).
Physician Perspectives and Practices in Breaking Bad News
Many physicians report delivering bad news to be a difficult and stressful
experience, even for those who do it frequently. In a survey of 700 members of the
American Society of Clinical Oncology, over 75% of clinicians reported breaking bad
news to a patient at least 5 times in a typical month, with 45% doing so 10 or more times
per month (Baile et al., 2000). Despite this frequency, 39% rated their ability to deliver
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bad news as only fair, and 8% considered it poor. Fifty-eight percent of all clinicians in
this survey identified “being honest but not taking away hope” to be the most difficult
aspect of breaking bad news (Baile et al., 2000; p. 303). A similar survey found that,
although the severity of distress experienced by most physicians while delivering bad
news was only moderate (M = 2.9 on a scale ranging from 1 [none] to 5 [a great deal]),
42% of physicians reported that the stress evoked in the delivery of bad news typically
lasted for several hours or even as long as 3 days after the conclusion of the consultation
(Ptacek, Ptacek & Ellison, 2001). Other studies have reported that physicians who give
bad news often (e.g., oncologists, colorectal surgeons) tend to experience high levels of
burnout, and physicians who perceived their training in communication skills to be
inadequate were more likely to report high levels of stress and burnout (Ramirez et al.,
1995; Sharma, Sharp, Walker, & Monson, 2007).
Less is known about physicians’ perspectives on communicating information
about prognosis. Generally speaking, physicians report much greater difficulty in
conveying prognosis than in disclosing diagnosis (Schofield & Butow, 2004). This
perception is reflected in physicians’ reported and observed practice. Although nearly all
physicians in Western countries report disclosing diagnoses to cancer patients except in
very rare or unusual cases (Novack et al., 1979), many physicians prefer to only discuss
prognosis once the patient has requested that information (Gordon & Daughtery, 2003).
One survey found that 29% of oncologists would occasionally withhold prognosis unless
a patient specifically requested that information, and 17% said they would almost always
do so (Baile, Lenzi, Parker, Buckman, & Cohen, 2002). Consistent with this survey, it
does appear that many physicians tend to delay or avoid disclosing prognostic
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information to patients. Perhaps the most notable documentation of this avoidance was
obtained in the innovative SUPPORT study. In that large multicenter center investigation
of 4,804 patients with life-limiting illnesses, a randomized intervention was implemented
with the express goal of improving communication and decision making between
patients, families, and physicians by (among other things) providing physicians with
reliable, computer-generated prognostic information that could be included in family
discussions of prognosis and treatment goals. Physicians, however, were not required to
use this information, and in the end only 15% of physicians reported that they shared the
prognostic information with patients and families (The SUPPORT Principal
Investigators, 1995). The reasons for this low percentage were unfortunately not
addressed in the study, but it seems possible that, in at least some cases, physicians felt
uncomfortable discussing poor prognoses.
A few studies have attempted to document physicians’ current practice of
breaking bad news by audiotaping and analyzing consultations between oncologists and
patients. One such study of patients with incurable cancer found that, although physicians
discussed goals of treatment with 85% of patients and identified their cancer as terminal
in 75% of cases, only 58% of patients received information about their life expectancy
(Gattellari, Voigt, Butow, & Tattersall, 2002). A more recent study used the same
methodology to examine oncologists’ use of framing in communicating prognosis to
patients with terminal cancer. The authors of that study found that oncologists were more
likely to discuss treatment-focused prognosis (e.g., chances of treatment working; 72%)
rather than disease-related prognosis (e.g., chances of survival; 28%). Further, 27% of
physicians’ prognostic statements were framed in terms of negative outcomes (i.e.,
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chance of death or treatment not working), 50% were framed in terms of positive
outcomes (i.e., chance of survival or cure), and 23% used mixed framing (Rodriguez et
al., 2008).
With a few exceptions (e.g., Baile et al., 2002), systematic studies have not been
conducted to elicit physicians’ perspectives on optimal approaches to delivering bad
news. Numerous editorials and opinion papers, however, have been written from the
perspective of physicians on how best to deliver bad news. This literature will be
summarized in the next section.
Practice Guidelines
General Review
Since the late 1970s, numerous articles and editorials with recommendations for
breaking bad news have been published in a variety of medical journals (e.g., Buckman,
1984; Campbell, 1994; Eggly et al., 2006; Fallowfield, 1993; VandeKieft, 2001). Most of
these articles were written by clinicians experienced in breaking bad news, and nearly all
were based solely on the authors’ opinions regarding best practices. There is notable
variability in the specificity, structure, and content of the guidelines. Several qualitative
reviews have attempted to address this variability by compiling and summarizing
individual recommendations, yet these reviews, too, have relied primarily on the
subjective judgment of individual authors (Barclay et al, 2007; Fallowfield & Jenkins,
2004; Ptacek & Eberhardt, 1996).
One group of researchers and practitioners in New South Wales, Australia
attempted to use a more systematic consensus process to develop a protocol for breaking
bad news (Girgis & Sanson-Fisher, 1995). Briefly, the authors first created a provisional
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list of guidelines by reviewing past literature. This list was then reviewed by a panel of
28 professionals (oncologists, nurses, surgeons, social workers, clergy, and human rights
experts), and subsequently rated by 100 cancer patients. Patients rated each guideline on
a 5-point scale: 1 (essential for doctor to do every time), 2 (desirable for doctor to do if
time permits), 3 (unsure), 4 (not necessary), 5 (never should be done). Sixteen guidelines
that were recommended by the professional panel and rated as desirable or essential by at
least 70% of patients were retained in the final protocol. These guidelines were:
1. Only one person should deliver the news.
2. Patients have an ethical and legal right to know their medical
information.
3. A physician’s main responsibility is to the patient.
4. Physicians should provide honest and reliable information.
5. Physicians should ask how much information patients want to hear.
6. Prepare the patient for the possibility of bad news as early as possible.
7. When disclosing results of several tests, do not give each result
separately.
8. Disclose the diagnosis to the patients as soon as it is confirmed.
9. Find a private location and help the patient feel comfortable.
10. If at all possible, allow significant others to be present.
11. If at all possible, another healthcare professional should be present.
12. Notify health care professionals involved in the patient's care of how
much the patient understood.
13. Express warmth, sympathy, encouragement, or reassurance with eye
contact and body language.
14. If the patient does not speak English, have an interpreter present.
15. Consider the culture, race, religious beliefs, and social background of
the patient.
16. Admit the emotional challenge of breaking bad news.
Girgis and Sanson-Fisher’s (1995) consensus process appears to be the most
systematic approach to guideline development to date, yet, unfortunately, the process still
suffered from several limitations. First, unlike the patient sample, it does not appear that
the professional panel used a systematic process in deriving their recommendations.
Second, the authors presented only the final pool of 16 guidelines, making it impossible
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to know whether their initial pool of guidelines (i.e., the provisional list based on
literature review) was consistent with other qualitative review studies. Finally, and most
importantly, although their consensus approach provided some preliminary evidence
regarding patients’ acceptance of practice guidelines, empirical evidence that these
guidelines influence important patient outcomes remains absent.
One of the most frequently cited and well-organized set of guidelines is the
SPIKES protocol (Baile et al., 2000). The acronym SPIKES stands for the six
recommended steps in the process of breaking bad news: (a) Setting up the interview, (b)
assessing the patient’s Perception, (c) obtaining the patient’s Invitation, (d) giving
Knowledge and information to the patient, (e) addressing the patient’s Emotions with
empathic responses, and (f) Strategy and Summary. Within each of these general steps,
more detailed tasks and techniques are suggested. For instance, when setting up the
interview, physicians are encouraged to find a private location, involve significant others,
sit down, make eye contact, and avoid interruptions. When giving knowledge and
information, the protocol recommends warning the patient that bad news is coming, using
nontechnical language (e.g., spread rather than metastasized), avoiding undue bluntness
(e.g., “You have very bad cancer and unless you get treatment immediately you are going
to die,” p. 306), and intermittently assessing the patient’s understanding. Like most
guidelines, Baile and colleagues developed the SPIKES protocol by synthesizing key
principles and communication strategies from several qualitative reviews and preexisting
guidelines for communicating bad news (e.g., Girgis & Sanson-Fisher, 1995; Ptacek &
Eberhart, 1996). Hence this and other recently developed protocols continue to be based
largely on expert consensus and descriptive studies of patient preferences.
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In general, guidelines for breaking bad news, including the two protocols just
described (Baile et al., 2000; Girgis & Sanson-Fisher, 1995) have been designed for
application to any bad news conversation and thus include only basic recommendations,
requiring each clinician to adapt the guidelines to his or her unique situation. Most
protocols focus on general communication style and technique and exclude guidelines in
specific content areas. For instance, neither SPIKES nor the Girgis and Sanson-Fisher
guidelines address how prognosis should be conveyed despite the fact that this topic has
been identified by physicians as one of the most difficult aspects of breaking bad news,
particularly in oncology (Baile et al., 2002; Gordon & Daughtery, 2003). Communication
about prognosis has been studied, though the literature on this topic is much smaller than
the general literature on breaking bad news. Furthermore, as one review pointed out, most
studies in the past have examined whether physicians should disclose information about
prognosis to patients, with only more recent research addressing how patients prefer that
prognostic information be conveyed (Hagerty et al., 2005).
In contrast to general guidelines for disclosing bad news, those that address
prognosis tend to be included in separate protocols that are specific to oncology or endof-life care. For instance, the Education in Palliative and End-of-Life Care (EPEC)
Project is a curriculum designed by experts at Northwestern University and across the
country to train physicians on how to care for dying patients (Emanuel, von Gunten, &
Ferris, 1999). One module of that curriculum contains guidelines for communicating bad
news, with one section (four short paragraphs) addressing how to communicate
prognosis. The curriculum is limited, however, in that it addresses only life expectancy
and appears to be based on expert consensus alone. The two main recommendations of
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this section include ascertaining why patients want to hear prognosis before revealing any
information and avoiding definitive estimates of life expectancy in favor of ranges or
averages (e.g., hours to days left to live).
A more comprehensive set of guidelines is included in the lengthy protocol
developed by the National Breast Cancer Centre and National Cancer Control Initiative
of Australia (2003). Among other topics, this protocol makes recommendations for
discussing prognosis including when prognosis should be discussed (e.g., prior to
treatment, as part of treatment decision-making), what information should be provided
(e.g., details of the cancer’s stage and the effect on prognosis, chances of cure and
average survival times), and how to discuss prognosis (e.g., framing prognosis in terms of
positive and negative outcomes, presenting information in multiple formats—both words
and numbers, both visual and verbal). The protocol was developed by a panel of
representatives from various disciplines involved in cancer care that reviewed and
synthesized existing literature. The authors cited the level of scientific evidence available
to support each of the recommendations, and, like the general bad news protocols, most
of the guidelines were based on expert consensus or self-report studies of patient
preferences.
Warning of Impending Bad News
Offering a warning, (i.e., a statement or set of statements given in advance of the
bad news to let the patient know that bad news is coming), is included in most published
guidelines (e.g., Baile et al., 2000; Barclay et al., 2007; Faulkner, Maguire, & Regnard,
1994; Miranda & Brody, 1992). Others have described this technique as forecasting
impending bad news (Maynard, 1996). Most recommendations discuss a simple, one line
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warning such as, “I’m afraid I have bad news,” given mere moments before conveying
the bad news itself. Others have suggested, however, that a warning may be given in
advance of the bad news consultation such as over the telephone when the appointment is
made (Ptacek & Eberhart, 1996). Further, the recommendation that “The patient…be
prepared for the possibility of bad news as early as possible” (Girgis, Sanson-Fisher &
Schofield, 1999, Table 1) found in some guidelines may be construed as implying that the
possibility of bad news should be forecasted prior to the actual consultation, perhaps even
before the bad news is certain.
Many authors describe warning as a technique intended “to reduce the element of
shock” (Ptacek & Eberhardt, 1996, p. 498). As one group of practitioners explained, “The
warning shot will give some indication to the person that they need to come to grips with
something that could be unpleasant” (Faulkner et al., 1994, p. 147). Authors have
suggested that reducing the shock of the news will have the two-fold effect of reducing
anxiety and distress and increasing subsequent comprehension of the information being
conveyed. For instance, Baile and colleagues (2000) suggested that warning “may
facilitate information processing” (p. 306). No research to date has explicitly tested these
presumed effects; however, the need to minimize shock and improve comprehension is
evidenced by studies reporting that many patients (47% in one survey of patients with
gynecologic cancer) feel “too shocked to take in any details” when first told that they
have cancer (Paraskevaidis et al., 1993).
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, warning of impending bad news appears
consistent with Sweeny and Shepperd’s (2007) bad news response model, which posits
that a person’s initial expectations regarding the likelihood of a future negative event is
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one factor that moderates subsequent emotional reactions when the negative event
actually occurs. As these authors explain, research has shown that receiving bad news is
particularly distressing when the news is unexpected.
For instance, one study tested college students for a fictitious medical condition
and manipulated participants’ expectations of receiving positive test results (i.e., bad
news) by informing them that college students were either at high risk or low risk for this
condition (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002). Participants assigned to the low risk condition
were told that it was unlikely they would test positive for this condition, whereas
participants in the high risk condition were told that it was likely that at least one student
in the group of three being tested would test positive. Participants’ mood was assessed
before receiving risk information and after receiving results of the test (5 minutes later).
After controlling for baseline mood, results indicated that participants who received
positive test results displayed worse mood when the results were unexpected (i.e., low
risk group) than when the results were expected (i.e., high risk group). The authors
suggested that when individuals expect a negative outcome, they are able to prepare
themselves emotionally for receiving bad news (Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007). This study
provides some preliminary evidence to suggest the potential benefits to forecasting
impending bad news; however, further research is needed to examine the effect of
warning patients directly, particularly in the manner recommended by current guidelines.
Aside from Shepperd and McNulty’s (2002) study, the only other research that
has investigated the effect of warning on patient outcomes was conducted in the
anesthesiology literature. This research looked at the effect of warning patients of
impending pain due to an injection. Findings from this study showed that patients who
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were warned that the needle might sting a little prior to receiving an injection actually
reported higher ratings of pain compared with participants who were told “many people
find the arm becomes heavy, numb and tingle tingly,” which “allows the drip to be placed
more comfortably” (Dutt-Gupta, Bown & Cyna, 2007, p. 872). Though the difference in
scenarios and outcome variables prevents direct comparison with Shepperd and
McNulty’s study, this research does suggest that warning of negative outcomes should
not be assumed to be universally beneficial. Experimental research could help to
determine whether forecasting bad news, such as a cancer diagnosis, has an effect on
patients’ mood, as well as other outcomes such as anxiety and information recall.
Framing of Prognostic Information
Framing has been defined as a manner of communicating that “influences how
information is conveyed by supporting some interpretations and downplaying others”
(Rodriguez et al., 2008, p. 219). In the case of prognosis, framing refers to whether
prognosis is described in terms of positive outcomes (e.g., chance of cure, 5-year
survival), negative outcomes (e.g., chance of relapse or death), or both (i.e., mixed
framing). Though mentioned less frequently than recommendations for giving a warning,
increasing consideration has been given for how to frame prognosis in both practice
guidelines (National Breast Cancer Centre and National Cancer Control Initiative of
Australia; 2003) and research literature (e.g., Barclay et al., 2007; Hagerty et al., 2005;
Rodriguez et al., 2008).
The guidelines developed by the National Breast Cancer Centre and National
Cancer Control Initiative of Australia (2003) suggest that physicians “Use mixed
framing: give chances of cure first, and then chances of relapse” (p. 50). This

22

recommendation does not appear to be followed in current practice, as one study found
that only 23% of oncologists’ comments regarding prognosis used mixed framing.
Indeed, some physicians appear to intentionally manipulate the framing of prognosis—
emphasizing survival rather than death, for example—in order to sound more optimistic
or to sustain patient’s hope (Rodriguez et al., 2008).
Additionally, as described earlier in this review, studies of patient preferences
have revealed interindividual variability across patients and conflicting results across
studies. One small study (N = 26) reported that all patients preferred to hear prognosis
framed in terms of positive outcomes (Davey et al., 2003). Another reported that 43% of
patients preferred positive framing and 33% preferred negative framing (Lobb et al.,
1999). Neither study inquired about patients’ preferences for mixed framing. In light of
this evidence, the rationale behind this guideline is not entirely clear. The
recommendation to use mixed framing appears to stem from concern that positive or
negative framing alone could bias patients’ interpretation of prognostic information, but
there are no data to support this concern nor are there explicit hypotheses regarding the
effect of positive versus negative versus mixed framing on patient outcomes.
The concern about potential framing bias likely originates in the health behavior
literature where the effect of framing on individuals’ judgment of risk and the likelihood
of engaging in certain health behaviors has been studied extensively. In general, studies
in this area report that loss-framed messages (i.e., messages emphasizing the negative
consequences of not performing a behavior) are more effective in promoting screening
behaviors, whereas gain-framed messages (i.e., messages emphasizing the benefits of
performing of a behavior) are more effective in promoting prevention behaviors
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(Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999). For example, one study found
that women were more likely to complete breast self-examinations after reading a lossframed brochure that highlighted the costs of failing to complete breast self-examinations
and the risk of dying from breast cancer than a gain-framed brochure highlighting the
benefits of breast self-examinations and chances of survival (Williams, Clarke, &
Borland, 2001).
Other research has found that framing the risk of potential side effects influences
patients’ willingness to accept medical treatment. For instance, one study found that
patients were significantly more likely to consent to a hypothetical treatment for chest
pain described as 99% safe (i.e., gain framing) compared with the same treatment
described as causing complications in 1 out of 100 people (i.e., loss framing; Gurm &
Litaker, 2000). Similarly, for a hypothetical scenario involving chemotherapy with poor
prognosis (probability of surviving less than 50%), cancer patients and healthy volunteers
both expressed weaker preference for that treatment when the probability was described
in terms of chance of death (i.e., negative framing) than when it was described in terms of
chance of survival (i.e., positive framing; O’Connor, 1989).
Unfortunately, results from the studies just described offer little guidance for
framing prognostic information. All of these studies targeted a particular behavioral
outcome such as a willingness to engage in a health behavior or to accept a treatment.
Conveying prognosis, in contrast, is not necessarily intended to produce an immediate or
specific change in patients’ behavior. In addition, studies have not explored participants’
interpretations or recall of the statistical information, nor have they examined the effect
of different framing formats on mood or anxiety. These additional outcomes may be
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important to consider when studying the framing of prognosis given patients’ tendency to
overestimate their prognosis (Weeks et al., 1998) and experience psychological distress
following receipt of bad news (Butow et al., 1996; Omne-Ponten et al., 1994).
Experimental research could help to determine whether framing influences how patients
hear and respond to news about their prognosis.
Limitations of Current Guidelines and Previous Research
For over 10 years the lack of empirical evidence has been discussed as a
limitation of guidelines on breaking bad news (e.g., Ptacek & Eberhart, 1996;
Wittenberg-Lyles, Goldsmith, Sanchez-Reilly, & Ragan, 2008). As Ptacek and Eberhardt
argued in their 1996 review, “Common sense suggests that there are better and worse
ways to convey bad news and that how the news is conveyed and the circumstances
surrounding the receipt of the news have implications for the giver and the receiver.
Reliance on common sense, however, is insufficient” (1996, p. 496). Given this
longstanding criticism, the paucity of research is striking but perhaps not surprising.
Studying communication as it naturally unfolds in health care settings is constrained by
practical and ethical limitations. Consequently, most research in this area has been
restricted to surveys of patient preferences and retrospective studies using correlational
methods. Both methodologies provide only limited evidence. Surveys of preferences
offer only one perspective on optimal approaches to health care communication, and
patients’ preferences may be biased by their own prior experiences of receiving bad
news. The issue of bias is also of concern in retrospective designs, which confound
patient recall of communication with patient outcomes. Neither approach allows the
methodological control necessary to determine whether particular communication
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strategies actually influence patient outcomes. Experimental research conducted in a
laboratory setting could help to fill this gap by systematically manipulating physicians’
communication and then observing how this affects the comprehension and emotional
response of people receiving diagnostic and prognostic information.
Several recent studies have had success in studying questions of communication
in oncology using a hypothetical scenario methodology. Most of these studies have used
a videotape paradigm where research participants are asked to imagine that they are
patients receiving news from a videotaped physician. One study randomized 123 healthy
breast cancer survivors and 87 age-matched women without cancer to watch one of two
videos of a physician discussing treatment options for cancer with a patient (Fogarty,
Curbow, Wingard, McDonnell, & Sommerfield, 1999). Half the women saw a standard
consultation video; the other half watched an enhanced compassion video, which
included an additional 40 seconds of empathic and supportive communication in which
the physician acknowledged the patient’s distress and offered support and reassurance.
As expected, there was a significant increase in postvideo anxiety for all participants
compared with baseline anxiety (no difference between cancer survivors and healthy
controls); however, women who saw the enhanced compassion consultation were
significantly less anxious than those who saw the standard consultation that did not
include empathic communication. There was no difference between the two groups’
recall of information presented in the consultation.
A similar study used a videotape paradigm to compare the effects of three
physician communication styles: patient-centered, disease-centered, and emotioncentered (Schmid Mast, Kindlimann, & Langewitz, 2005). Briefly, patient-centered
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communication was described as understanding and positive, disease-centered
communication was described as blunt and insensitive, and emotion-centered
communication was described as kind and sad. Participants were 159 female college
students who were randomly assigned to watch a video of a physician disclosing a
diagnosis of breast cancer and explaining treatment options to a female patient. Results
indicated that participants perceived the patient-centered physician as more emotional
and appropriate in conveying the information than the other two communication styles. In
addition, participant satisfaction in the patient-centered condition was significantly higher
than in both the disease- and emotion-centered conditions. Finally, participants who
viewed the disease- and emotion-centered videos showed a significant increase in
postvideo tension/anger compared with baseline, whereas patients who saw the patientcentered video did not show an increase on this dimension. No other group differences
were found for the effect of communication style on participant emotions.
A similar study examined the effect of physician communication style and
physician gender on patient satisfaction using a virtual medical visit paradigm (Schmid
Mast, Hall, & Roter, 2007). This study was unique because the physician was a
computer-generated person who appeared on a computer screen and interacted with
participants using prerecorded statements. The 167 college student participants then
responded to the physician using scripted prompts that they were asked to put into their
own words. Participants were asked to imagine that they had been experiencing
headaches and were seeing the doctor to discuss symptoms, test results, and treatment. In
contrast to other studies, the scenarios did not involve a diagnosis of cancer or other
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serious illness; it is unclear from the article whether the test results involved breaking bad
news, though this was not a focus of the study.
Communication style in the videos was varied along two dimensions: physician
dominance (high or low) and physician caring (high or low). Physician gender was also
manipulated. Results revealed a four-way interaction of physician dominance, physician
caring, physician sex, and patient sex. For men communication style did not affect
satisfaction in any scenario. In contrast, women who saw a female physician were more
satisfied when the physician used a caring style (with no effect for dominance), and
women who saw a male physician were less satisfied when the physician used a caring
and nondominant style (Schmid Mast et al., 2007).
Although the three studies described here provide preliminary evidence that a
video paradigm can be used to study the effects of physician communication, they have
weaknesses. Two used college student samples; they examined limited outcomes such as
patient satisfaction; and their focus was on broad communication styles, which make it
difficult to identify specific communication behaviors that are most important in breaking
bad news. The only video study to manipulate a discrete behavior examined the effect of
physician posture when breaking bad news, finding that palliative care patients preferred
physicians who delivered bad news while sitting down and perceived those physicians to
be more compassionate compared with a physician who delivered bad news while
standing up (Bruera et al., 2007). This study, however, had substantial limitations; most
notably, the researchers showed patients both videos and found an order effect in which
patients preferred the physician in the second video regardless of posture.
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The videotape paradigm clearly shows promise in contributing to our
understanding of optimal approaches to communicating bad news. It is highly controlled,
enabling researchers to hold constant variables such as disease type and severity, length
of consultation, and the content of the conversation so that specific communication
variables of interest can be tested. In addition, the videotape approach allows researchers
to assess anxiety, recall, and other important patient outcomes immediately after the bad
news conversation, a procedure often not practically possible when using real patients.
Despite these benefits, no studies have used this methodology to examine the effects of
forecasting bad news or framing prognosis.
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CHAPTER 3: RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the effects of forecasting bad
news and framing prognostic information when people receive a life-limiting diagnosis.
An experimental videotape paradigm was used to permit the methodological control
absent from most prior studies. Holding constant the other components of a bad news
consultation, the two variables of forecasting and framing were manipulated across
conditions. This approach maximized the ability of the study to discern differences in
individuals’ perceptions and affective response according to specific communication
behaviors. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four videotape conditions in a
two (warning vs. no warning) by two (positive vs. negative framing) factorial design.
Warning Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. Participants who were warned of impending bad news were expected to
report higher positive affect and lower negative affect after receipt of the
diagnosis compared with participants who were not warned of the news.
This hypothesis is consistent with expert consensus and with Sweeny and
Sheppard’s (2007) bad news response model, which posits that individuals who expect a
negative outcome will experience less negative affect than those not expecting a negative
outcome when the negative outcome occurs.
Hypothesis 2. Participants who were warned of impending bad news were expected to
report lower anxiety after receipt of the diagnosis compared with participants
who were not warned of the news.
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This hypothesis is also consistent with the bad news response model (Sweeny &
Sheppard, 2007), although the authors do not make specific reference to anxiety in their
theory.
Hypothesis 3. Participants who were warned of impending bad news and those who were
not were expected to demonstrate equivalent recall of the consultation content.
Though it has been suggested in practice guidelines that forecasting bad news
should result in improved recall due to a reduction in anxiety that mediates improved
information processing, it was expected that any reduction in anxiety experienced in this
study would not be large or significant enough to influence recall of consultation content.
Fogarty and colleagues (1999) failed to find improvement in participant recall in their
videotape study of physician empathy, despite a significant reduction in anxiety in the
enhanced empathy condition. It was anticipated that the effect of warning on anxiety
would be smaller than the effect of empathy because of differences in the robustness of
the manipulation; the present study uses a one-sentence warning compared with 40
seconds of empathic communication in the study by Fogarty et al. Thus, I did not expect
to find an effect of the warning condition on participant recall.
Framing Hypotheses
Hypothesis 4. Participants who heard a positively framed prognosis and those who heard
a negatively framed prognosis were hypothesized to be equally accurate in their
recall of the statistical percentages given by the physician when explaining
prognosis.
Prognosis framing was not expected to influence participants’ recall of the
prognosis. Though recall has rarely been addressed in prior framing research, one study
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of the effect of message framing on breast self-examination reported that participants in
positive and negative framing conditions did not differ on recall of the information
presented in the pamphlet they read (Myerowitz & Chaiken, 1987).
Hypothesis 5. Participants who heard a negatively framed prognosis were expected to
interpret the news as worse than participants who heard a positively framed
prognosis.
Though no prior research has addressed the effect of prognosis framing on
participants’ interpretations of that information, the rationale for this hypothesis is
implicit in the definition of framing: communication that “influences how information is
conveyed by supporting some interpretations and downplaying others” (Rodriguez et al.,
2008, p. 219). Consistent with this definition, positive-outcome framing has been cited as
a strategy used to imply that there is hope (Lamont & Christakis, 2001; Rodriguez et al.,
2008). Furthermore, that positive and negative framing may lead to different
interpretations is suggested by a study reporting that positively framed prognoses are
perceived as encouraging “determination to manage treatment positively,” whereas
negatively framed prognoses are perceived as perceived as more “specific/precise” and
are interpreted as highlighting the need for additional treatment (Lobb et al., 1999, Box
4).
Hypothesis 6. Participants who heard a negatively framed prognosis were expected to
report lower positive affect and higher negative affect compared with participants
who heard a positively framed prognosis.
Though no prior research has examined the effect of prognosis framing on affect,
logic and expert consensus suggest that the focus on treatment failure and the increased
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salience of death in the negative framing condition, in contrast with the focus on
treatment success and survival in the positive framing condition, would be associated
with worse affect.
Hypothesis 7. Participants who heard a negatively framed prognosis were expected to
report higher anxiety compared with participants who heard a positively framed
prognosis.
Similar to the hypothesized effects on affect, no prior research has examined the
effect of prognosis framing on anxiety. A similar logic, however, suggests that the
negative frame’s focus on treatment failure and the increased salience of death, in
contrast with the focus on treatment success and survival in the positive framing
condition, would be associated with greater anxiety.
Hypothesis 8. Participants who heard a negatively framed prognosis were expected to
feel less hopeful for the future compared with participants who heard a positively
framed prognosis.
Though prior research has not examined the relationship between framing and
hopefulness, physicians have reported using positive outcome framing to preserve patient
hope (Lamont & Christakis, 2001; Rodriguez et al., 2008). Furthermore, studies have
shown that some patients prefer hearing a positively framed prognosis because it
“encourages determination to manage treatment positively” (Lobb et al., 1999, Box 4). In
addition, a pessimistic attitude has been reported by patients to decrease feelings of
hopefulness (Sardell & Trieweiler, 1993).
Additional Research Questions
Personality
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I explored relationships between individual differences in personality and
participants’ affect, anxiety, and hope following the receipt of bad news. Also of interest
was whether these individual differences might interact with communication variables
(warning and framing) to influence affect, anxiety, and hope. I had no a priori hypotheses
about these relationships.
Health Information Style
I also explored relationships between individual differences in health information
style and participants’ affect, anxiety, and hope following the receipt of bad news.
Participants with greater preferences for health information were expected to report lower
negative affect, higher positive affect, and lower anxiety after receiving bad news. Also
of interest was whether these individual differences might interact with communication
variables (warning and framing) to influence affect, anxiety, and hope.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS
Participants
Power
Fogarty and colleagues (1999) reported that the average difference in anxiety
(using the STAI-S) between participants who watched an enhanced compassion video of
a physician discussing breast cancer and those who watched a standard physician video
was 4.7 with a standard deviation of 5.94. This resulted in an effect size (Cohen’s d) of
.79, which was similar to the effect size reported by another videotape study using the
Profile of Mood States to detect differences in the tension/anger domain (Schmid Mast et
al., 2005). Despite these rather substantial effect sizes, a decision was made to use a more
conservative effect size to determine sample size for the current study because the focus
on more narrow aspects of communication such as warning (which was composed of
only one statement) and framing (which was manipulated using just two statements) was
expected to produce a smaller change in anxiety than the roughly 40 seconds of
compassionate statements used to manipulate compassion by Fogarty et al. (1999). In
addition, some hypotheses posited a null relation; interpretation of the failure to reject the
null hypothesis as reflecting little difference in the populations is more tenable with a
larger sample size. Thus for a Cohen’s d effect size of .35 on anxiety with a two-tailed
significance level of 0.05 and 80% power, a sample of 128 was required.
Participant Characteristics
The 128 participants were healthy, community-dwelling adults ranging in age
from 50 to 87 years. Because this study used a hypothetical scenario involving a
diagnosis of colon cancer, this age cut-off was selected based on epidemiological data
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showing that the risk of developing colon cancer increases substantially after age 50.
According to the American Cancer Society, more than 90% of individuals diagnosed with
colorectal cancer are over 50 years old, and the organization recommends regular colon
cancer screenings (i.e., colonoscopies) beginning at age 50 (American Cancer Society,
2008a).
All participants were recruited from Volunteers for Health, a research participant
registry maintained by Barnes Jewish Hospital as well as the Psychology Department’s
Older Adult Volunteer Pool. Participants were not cancer patients, although individuals
with personal or family history of cancer were not excluded. Participants were screened
for significant cognitive impairment using the Blessed Orientation-MemoryConcentration Test (Katzman et al., 1983). Participants with scores of six or greater were
excluded. The only other exclusion criterion was medical training; individuals with
training or experience as physicians were excluded from the study. Participants with
other allied health training such as nurses, physician’s assistants, and pharmacists were
not excluded.
Materials
Vignettes
Two vignettes (Appendix A) were used to help participants imagine themselves in
a hypothetical medical scenario prior to receiving bad news. The medical information
provided in the vignettes was based on current information in the oncologic literature
(Mayo Clinic Staff, 2008; National Cancer Institute, 2008). The first vignette asked
participants to imagine that they were seeing a physician for recurrent stomach pains.
This vignette included a brief description of their symptoms, indicated that they have
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seen a doctor once, had undergone a colonoscopy, and were seeing their doctor for the
second time today; the goal of the current visit was to discuss the test results from the
prior visit.
The second vignette, which participants read later in the experiment, asked them
to imagine that they were coming back to see the doctor a week later to receive results
from more extensive testing that was done to determine the stage of their cancer. This
vignette identified the procedures done in the intervening week and described how the
participant was feeling physically.
Videotapes
Overview. In addition to the two vignettes four videotapes were created to
examine the research questions posed in this study. Videotapes were modeled after those
used in previous studies using this paradigm (e.g., Fogarty et al., 1999); two videos
depicted a physician disclosing a diagnosis of colon cancer, and two videos depicted a
physician discussing prognosis. The same physician was portrayed in all four videos.
Videos were not intended to replicate an entire medical consultation but, rather, were
designed to depict only brief 2-minute segments of a typical consultation. Scripts were
reviewed for content by a gastroenterologist, a colorectal surgeon, and an oncologist
experienced in diagnosis and bad news communication. The medical details and
prognostic information included in the videos were based on current information in the
oncologic literature (American Cancer Society, 2008b; National Cancer Institute, 2008).
Video scripts were developed in accordance with current recommendations for delivering
bad news such as expressing empathy and avoiding medical jargon. See Appendix B for
copies of the video scripts. Manipulation statements are in bold.
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All four videotapes were recorded with an actual physician delivering each script
while sitting at a desk in his office. In order to make the experience more realistic for the
participant, tapes were recorded with the physician facing the camera as if he were
communicating with the participant directly. Videos A1 and A2 were approximately 2
min in duration. Videos B1 and B2 were approximately 1 min 50 sec in duration.
Participants viewed videos on a desktop computer screen using the program QuickTime
7.6.
Warning videos (A1 and A2). The bad news warning variable consisted of two
levels (warning vs. no warning) and was manipulated in the two diagnosis videos. Both
diagnosis videos included the following elements: brief greeting, summary of the
patients’ symptoms and prior medical visit, description of test results and disclosure of a
cancer diagnosis, and brief summary of recommended next steps. In the warning
condition (A1) the video script contained one statement not included in the no warning
condition (A2): “I’m afraid I have bad news.” [Pauses momentarily, making eye contact
with patient.]. Video A2 (no warning) was created using the video footage from video A1
and editing out the warning statement listed above.
Framing Videos (B1 and B2). The prognostic framing variable also had two
levels (positive vs. negative-outcome) and was manipulated in the prognosis videos. Both
prognosis videos contained a brief greeting, summary of procedures completed since the
last visit, a statement about the spread of the disease, recommendations for treatment,
disclosure of prognosis statistics, and closing remarks. These videos were identical
except for details in two sentences describing prognosis:
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1. Fortunately, there’s about an 80% chance that you will remain cancer free after
treatment. In addition, I can tell you that about 65% of people who are your age
and have this disease will be alive in 5 years (positive-outcome framing; B1).
2. Unfortunately, there’s about a 20% chance that your cancer will come back after
treatment. In addition, I can tell you that about 35% of people who are your age
and have this disease will die within 5 years (negative-outcome framing; B2).
Video B2 (negative framing) was created by editing the video footage from video B1 to
replace the two positively framed sentences with the two negatively framed sentences.
Measures
Demographics Variables
Participants provided information about their age, gender, ethnicity, education,
and relationship status.
Health
Participants were asked to rate their overall health with one question from the
Medical Outcomes Study Short-Form Health Survey (SF-36; Ware, 1993). The question
reads: “In general, would you say your health is…” Response options ranged from 1
(poor) to 5 (excellent) with higher scores indicating better overall health. Participants
were also asked about their personal and family/close friend history of serious illness,
including cancer. Using a modified listing developed for a study of stress and health in
aging, participants reviewed a list of illnesses and conditions including diabetes, cancer,
stroke, heart disease, and high blood pressure (Stanford Medical School Investigators,
2008). Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they or their close friends or
family members have ever been diagnosed with any of the listed illnesses.
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Personality
The NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO FFI) was used to assess personality (Costa
& McCrae, 1992). The NEO-FFI is a shortened, 60-item version of the NEO Personality
Inventory-Revised (NEO PI-R) and is designed to assess the five domains of personality
originally described by Costa and McCrae (1992): Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability/Neuroticism, and Intellect/Openness. Each of the
five factors is assessed with 12 statements (e.g., “I am not a worrier;” “I like to have a lot
of people around me”). Participants rate the degree to which statement describes them
using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Responses are summed for each factor; scores range from 12 to 60 with higher scores
signifying more of the trait. According to the manual internal consistency reliabilities
range from .74 to .89. In the current study, Cronbach’s alphas for the 5 scales were as
follows: Neuroticism, .88; Extraversion, .74; Openness, .74; Agreeableness, .78; and
Conscientiousness, .87.
Health Information Style
Participant preferences for information and involvement in medical decisionmaking was assessed with the Information Subscale of the Krantz Health Opinion Survey
(KHOS-I; Krantz, Baum & Wideman, 1980). This subscale includes seven statements
about individuals’ tendency to ask questions during health care consultations as well as
the level of involvement they desire in decisions about their own medical care. For each
item participants indicate whether they agree (0) or disagree (1) with the statement.
Responses from individual items are summed, and scores range from 0 to 7, with higher
scores indicating a greater information-seeking style. The KHOS-I has been used
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extensively in studies of patient-physician communication and has been shown to predict
the number of questions asked by patients in a medical consultation (Krantz et al., 1980)
as well as cancer patients’ preferences for greater information about their prognosis
(Hagerty et al., 2004). Internal consistency reliability for the KHOS-I has been reported
at .76 (Krantz et al., 1980). The alpha for the current study was .74.
Dependent Variables
Self-reported mood/affect. The short form of the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (Short PANAS; Kercher, 1992; Mackinnon et al., 1999) was used to assess
participants’ affect. The Short PANAS consists of 10 adjectives describing particular
emotions, selected from the original 20 adjectives in the original PANAS (Watson, Clark
& Tellegen, 1988) in an effort to maintain the integrity of the distinct constructs of
positive and negative affect. Five of these adjectives describe positive affect (inspired,
alert, excited, enthusiastic, determined), and five adjectives describe negative affect
(afraid, upset, nervous, scared, distressed). Participants indicate to what extent each
adjective describes the way they are feeling at the moment. Response options are
presented on five-point Likert scale: 1 (very slightly or not at all), 2 (a little), 3
(moderately), 4 (quite a bit), and 5 (extremely). Separate scores are computed for the
positive and negative subscales by summing responses to each item. Scores range from 5
to 25 with higher scores reflecting greater positive (or negative) affect. Previous research
has shown the Short PANAS to have good reliability with adults (ages 18 to 79) for both
scales (internal consistency of .78 for the positive scale and .87 for the negative affect
scale). Similar alphas have been reported with older adults (i.e., 65 years and older; .72
for positive affect and .86 for negative affect). In the current study, alphas were .62, .73,
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.81 and .75 for positive affect, and .96, .95, .95, and .95 for negative affect at the
prewarning, postwarning, preframing, and postframing assessments, respectively. The
low alpha for prewarning positive affect was likely due to the ambiguous meaning of
some positive items (e.g., excited) combined with the fact that at this first administration
participants were adjusting to the instructions to respond according to how they felt in
that moment, based on the hypothetical scenario they had just read. By the second
(postwarning) administration of the PANAS, participants had adjusted to these
instructions and were well immersed in the scenario, resulting in more internally
consistent responses.
Anxiety. State anxiety was assessed with the six-item short form State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory, State Version (STAI-S; Marteau & Bekker, 1992). This short form
survey was created as a more time efficient measure that still maintains the psychometric
integrity of the original STAI-S (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983).
The scale was developed by computing item-remainder correlations between each of the
20 statements with the 19 remaining items in the original STAI-S. The authors then
selected the three anxiety-present items (I feel tense, I feel upset, I feel worried) and the
three anxiety-absent items (I feel calm, I feel relaxed, I feel content) that had the highest
item-remainder correlations. The number of items was chosen to balance the minimum
number of items with the best possible reliability and correlation with the original scale.
The authors also tested 10-, 8-, 4-, and 2-item versions of the scale.
Like the original STAI-S, participants rate their current feelings on a 4-point
Likert scale: 1 (not at all), 2 (somewhat), 3 (moderately), 4 (very much). Responses to
each item are summed. Scores range from 6 to 24 with higher scores indicating greater
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anxiety. The 6-item scale has a reported alpha-reliability of .82 in pregnant outpatients,
and scores on the abbreviated scale correlate .91 with the scores on the 20-item scale
(Marteau & Bekker, 1992). In the current study, alphas were .93, .92, .91, and .90 at the
prewarning, postwarning, preframing, and postframing assessments, respectively.
Information recall. After the diagnosis video, participants answered six yes/no
questions (Appendix C) developed for this study to test recall of the information provided
by the physician regarding diagnosis (name and details of condition), treatment, and
recommendations. Correct answers were summed, and scores ranged from 0 to 6, with
higher scores indicating better recall.
Prognosis recall. First, participants were presented with one free-recall question
which asked them to “write what you remember the doctor telling you about what to
expect in the future, especially any percentages or statistics that the doctor gave you.”
These qualitative responses were not analyzed in the current study. Next, two cued-recall
questions asked participants to recall the information provided about their prognosis
(chances of recurrence; 5-year survival rate or 5-year mortality rate). For instance,
participants in the positive framing condition were asked, “What are the chances that you
will remain cancer free after treatment?” Participants in the negative framing condition
were asked, “What are the chances that your cancer will come back after treatment?”
Similarly, participants in the positive framing condition were asked, “What percentage of
people who are your age and have this disease are alive in 5 years?” Participants in the
negative framing condition were asked, “What percentage of people who are your age
and have this disease die within 5 years?” In each case, participants were instructed to
record the percentage given by the doctor for that particular prognostic statement.
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Interpretations of prognosis. In addition to their ability to recall the percentages
provided, we assessed participants’ interpretations of the prognostic information
conveyed. After the prognosis video participants rated the news they received from the
physician on a 100-point scale ranging from 0 (worst news I could have ever received) to
100 (best news I could have ever received). A similar measure (on a 10-point scale) has
been used in previous studies of communication in cancer (e.g., Gattellari et al., 2002).
Hopefulness. Participants’ feelings of hopefulness for the future were assessed
using a modified version of the Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R; Scheier, Carver
& Bridges, 1994). This scale includes 10 statements; 3 statements are positively framed
(e.g., Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad), 3 statements are
negatively framed (e.g., If something can go wrong for me, it will), and 4 statements are
unscored filler items. Participants rate their agreement with each statement on a 5-point
Likert scale: 0 (strongly disagree), 1 (disagree), 2 (neutral—neither agree nor disagree),
3 (agree), 4 (strongly agree). Participants in this study were instructed to rate their
agreement now, after hearing the news from the physician. Scores ranges from 0 to 24,
with higher scores indicating greater hopefulness. Although the LOT-R was originally
developed as a trait measure, the scale has been used as an outcome variable in
psychological intervention studies with cancer patients, who had increased positive
orientation on the LOT-R following a stress management intervention (Antoni et al.,
2001). A Cronbach’s alpha of .78 has been reported for the six scored items (Scheier et
al., 1994). Alphas for the current study were .85 at the prevideo assessment and .80 at the
postvideo assessment.
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In addition to this standardized questionnaire, hope was assessed by asking
participants to rate how hopeful they felt in nine domains: that they will live 1 year; live 5
years; live 10 years; live longer than the doctor expects; receive the treatment they need;
the cancer will never return after treatment; they will remain independent after treatment;
any pain or symptoms will be well controlled; and that they will be well cared for and
supported. Finally, participants rated how hopeful they felt about the future overall. All
ten of these ratings were made on a 100-point scale, ranging from 0 (not at all hopeful) to
100 (extremely hopeful). Cronbach’s alpha for the ten items was .88. See Appendix D for
the full questionnaire.
Procedure
Potential participants from Volunteers for Health and the Psychology
Department’s Older Adult Volunteer Pool were screened by phone for medical training or
significant cognitive impairment. Those who met the criteria described in the previous
section were invited to participate. Participants generally reviewed the consent
documents and completed the demographics questions, a personality inventory, and
health information style measures at home prior to coming to their appointment. The
experiment itself was conducted at the Psychological Services Center, and the consent
process was administered in a therapy room, which was intended to mimic the waiting
room in a doctor’s office. After providing informed consent, participants who elected not
to fill out the baseline assessment measures at home completed those questionnaires in
the therapy room. See Table 1 for a timeline of procedures and assessments.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four videotape conditions: (a) warning,
positive outcome framing, (b) no warning, positive outcome framing, (c) warning,
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negative outcome framing, and (d) no warning, negative outcome framing.
Randomization was conducted using the random list generator at the website
www.random.org. Each participant watched one of two diagnosis videos, in which the
bad news warning was manipulated, followed by one of two prognosis videos, in which
the framing of the prognostic information was manipulated.
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Table 1
Time of Procedures and Assessments

Step

Activity

1

Obtain demographics
Assess personality
Assess health information style

2

Read Vignette A (initial symptoms and tests)
Write about thoughts and feelings (2.5 minutes)

3

Administer affect and anxiety measures (first time)

4

Watch Video A (cancer diagnosis)

5

Administer affect and anxiety measures (second time)
Recall information provided by physician

6

Write about thoughts and feelings concerning cancer diagnosis (5 minutes)
BREAK (5 minutes)

7

Read Vignette B (interim surgery and biopsy)
Write about thoughts and feelings (2 minutes)

8

Administer affect and anxiety measures (third time)
Administer hopefulness scale (first time)

9

Watch Video B (prognosis)

10

Administer affect and anxiety measures (fourth time)
Administer hopefulness scale (second time)
Recall prognosis
Interpret prognosis
Rate hopefulness domains
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Prior to watching the first video all participants read a brief vignette that instructed them
to imagine that they were seeing a physician for recurrent stomach pains. As described
previously, the vignette (Appendix A) included a brief description of their symptoms and
an explanation that they were seeing their doctor for the second time to discuss the test
results from the prior visit. After reading the vignette, participants were asked to imagine
that they were in this situation and to write for 2.5 minutes about what they are thinking
and feeling. The writing task was intended to help participants imagine themselves in the
medical scenario. Immediately after writing participants completed baseline affect and
anxiety measures. They were then be taken into a private experiment room where they
were reminded again to imagine that they were really meeting with the doctor and that
the doctor would be speaking to them about their test results. After the experimenter left
the participant alone and closed the door, participants watched one of the two videos of a
physician disclosing a diagnosis of cancer. Immediately after watching the first video
participants again completed affect and anxiety measures as well as questionnaires that
assessed their recall of the information provided. These questionnaires were administered
with pencil and paper and were concealed in a folder until after participants had viewed
the video.
Participants were then taken back to the original therapy room where they were
asked to think about the news they had just received. As a filler task before viewing the
second video, participants were instructed to think about the news they had received (i.e.,
the diagnosis of colon cancer) and about preparing for the recommended surgery and to
write about their thoughts and feelings about their situation for 5 minutes. When they
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finished writing all participants were given a 5-minute break, during which time they
could use the rest room, get a drink of water, or read a magazine.
Following the break, all participants read a second vignette (Appendix A) that
instructed them to imagine that they were coming back approximately a week later to
receive results from more extensive testing that was done to determine the stage of their
cancer. Participants then completed measures of anxiety, affect, and hopefulness before
being taken back to the private experiment room where they watched a second video that
depicted the same physician discussing prognosis and treatment for colon cancer.
Following this second video participants repeated affect, anxiety, and hopefulness
measures as well as questionnaires that assessed their recall of the prognosis,
interpretations of prognosis, and additional ratings of hope. Finally, participants were
debriefed and paid $15 for their participation.
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CHAPTER 5: PILOT STUDIES
A pilot study was conducted with the stimuli described in the previous chapter in
order to determine the feasibility of using a videotape paradigm and to examine
participants’ ability to detect the manipulation statements. Individuals read two vignettes
described previously (see Appendix B). The first vignette asked participants to imagine
that they had been experiencing stomach pains, had undergone a colonoscopy, and were
going to the doctor to hear the results of additional tests. The second vignette asked
participants to imagine that they had undergone surgery for colon cancer and were going
back to the doctor to hear the results of additional tests. After reading each vignette
participants watched a video of a doctor speaking with them and then completed
questions designed to test the effectiveness of the manipulation.
Ten older adults (aged 50 to 85 years) completed the pilot study. For the warning
video 100% were able to correctly identify whether they had received a warning of bad
news prior to being told that they had colon cancer. For the prognosis video 80% of
participants were able to correctly identify the framing of their chances of the treatment
getting rid of the cancer, and 90% were able to correctly identify whether they had been
told their chances of survival or their chances of death.
A qualitative review of individual warning data revealed two participants who did
not specifically remember the warning “I’m afraid I have bad news” in response to a freerecall question. Despite being unable to recall this specific phrase, these participants did
report that the physician had let them know that the news was going to be bad; all 5
participants in the no warning condition reported that the physician did not say anything
to let them know that the news was going to be bad.
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A qualitative review of the prognosis framing data revealed three participants who
erroneously reported that the physician had given them one of the two prognostic
statements framed in both positive and negative terms. When queried, it became apparent
that some participants recognized that the two phrases were statistically equivalent, but
they were correctly able to identify which framing had been given to them. The question
was modified to emphasize recall of the exact phrases uttered by the physician; this
modification appeared to be effective; all subsequent participants correctly recalled the
prognosis they had received after the question was changed. Notably, the prognosis
statements in the scripts tested in the pilot study included ranges of percentages that were
partially overlapping (e.g., 60 to 65% of people who are your age and have this disease
will be alive in 5 years; there is a 55 to 60% that the cancer will come back after
treatment.). I removed the ranges of percentages in order to reduce the load placed on
participants’ memory and potential confusion between the two prognostic phrases.
Participants reported that the computer screen on which the videos were displayed
was a comfortable size and the videos were audible and easy to understand. After the
experiment several participants commented on similar medical events experienced by
themselves or their loved ones; they reported no difficulty in imagining themselves in the
situation described.
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used to assess equivalence of the four
warning/framing groups on several demographic and health-related variables. Two
analyses of variance (ANOVA) were computed to determine whether participants in the
four warning and framing conditions differed by age or self-reported health (see Table 2).
Chi-square tests of association were computed to determine if participants in the four
conditions differed by gender, ethnicity, education, relationship status, personal history of
cancer, or having a family member or friend with cancer (see Table 3). There were no
significant differences between groups on any of these variables (all ps > .05); therefore,
none were included as covariates in subsequent analyses.

Table 2
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Participant Characteristics by Condition

Negative frame

Positive frame

Age (years)
Health

Warninga

No warninga

69.12 (8.81)

66.41 (9.03)

3.56 (.95)

3.84 (0.77)

Warninga

No warninga

71.69 (10.75) 68.78 (11.14)
3.47 (1.02)

3.56 (.98)

F(3, 124)

1.50
0.97

Note. Condition means compared with ANOVAs. All ps > .05. Health ratings were on a
4-point scale ranging from 1 (poor) to 4 (excellent).
a

n = 32 for each condition.
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Table 3
Percentages of Participant Characteristics by Condition

Negative frame

Positive frame
Warning

a

No warninga

Warninga

No warninga

χ2(df)

53

59

53

37

3.35 (3)

Black

6

3

6

6

0.45 (3)

White

94

97

94

94

High School/GED

13

13

19

28

Some college

22

28

19

28

College degree

31

25

25

13

Some grad school

9

6

0

6

Master’s degree

22

22

31

22

Professional degree

3

6

6

3

Never married

3

13

13

6

Married/partnered

62

56

47

75

Widowed

16

6

28

3

Separated/divorced

19

25

12

16

Personal cancer hx

28

22

38

19

3.36 (3)

Family/friend cancer hx

84

75

88

72

3.28 (3)

Gender
Female
Race

Education
10.6 (15)

Relationship status
15.3 (9)

Note. All ps > .05. Personal cancer hx = Positive personal history of cancer. Family/friend cancer
hx = Positive family or friend history of cancer.
a

n = 32 for each condition.
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Tests of Hypotheses
Warning Hypotheses
The first set of data analyses addressed hypotheses concerning warning or no
warning about bad news. The measures used in these analyses included the affect,
anxiety, and content memory scores collected immediately before and after viewing the
first video. Half of the participants saw a video with a warning and the other half saw a
video without a warning.
Prior to conducting the primary analyses, a manipulation check was conducted to
determine whether participants in the two warning conditions were able to detect whether
or not they had received a warning. After viewing the first video, participants were asked,
“Right before the doctor told you that you had cancer, did he say anything that let you
know that the news was going to be bad?” Participants in the warning condition should
have answered yes to this question, and participants in the no warning condition should
have answered no. A chi-square test of association revealed a significant difference in
the two groups’ responses to this question, χ2(1, N = 128) = 22.8, p < .001. Seventy-one
percent of the sample (91 participants) correctly identified whether the physician had
warned them of the impending bad news. Of the 29% who did not, 20 participants (54%)
in the no-warning condition erroneously thought they received a warning, and 17
participants (46%) in the warning condition did not realize they received a warning.
Subsequent warning hypotheses were tested with data from the full sample as well as the
subsample of 91 participants who correctly identified the warning condition to which
they had been randomized.
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Hypothesis 1. Participants who are warned of impending bad news will report higher
positive affect and lower negative affect after receipt of the diagnosis compared
with participants who are not warned of the news.
Hypothesis 2. Participants who are warned of impending bad news will report lower
anxiety after receipt of the diagnosis compared with participants who are not
warned of the news.
Means and standard deviations for the affect and anxiety measures are presented
in Table 4. In order to test the effect of warning on these measures, individual
unstandardized residuals for each of the three dependent variables were first calculated in
order to partial out the variance in prevideo affect and anxiety scores. Specifically,
postvideo scores were regressed on prevideo scores in a linear regression for each of the
measures. The estimates of postvideo scores from these regression equations were then
subtracted from the observed postvideo scores. The resultant residual postvideo scores for
positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety were entered as dependent variables in a
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Group (warning vs. no warning) was
entered as a between-subjects variable. Results of the MANOVA failed to yield a
significant multivariate effect of warning group, Pillai’s trace V = .01, F(3, 124) = 0.49 p
= .69.
To ensure that the nonsignificant effect of warning was not due to participants’
failure to identify the manipulation (warning vs. no warning), several additional analyses
were conducted. First, a MANOVA was conducted for each condition (i.e., warning and
no warning) comparing those who had accurately identified the manipulation with those
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who had not on residualized positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety scores. For both
the warning and no-warning conditions, there was no significant difference between the
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Positive Affect, Negative Affect, and Anxiety by
Warning Condition
Warningb

No warningb

M

SD

M

SD

Prevideo positive affect

12.68

3.36

12.36

4.07

Postvideo positive affect

13.75

4.34

13.20

3.99

Prevideo negative affect

11.90

6.13

12.68

6.44

Postvideo negative affect

19.12

5.73

18.64

6.19

Prevideo anxiety

13.64

5.97

14.44

5.51

Postvideo anxiety

18.66

5.13

18.55

5.42

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

Anxiety

Note. Positive and negative affect scores each ranged from 5 to 25, with higher scores
reflecting greater positive (or negative) affect. Anxiety scores ranged from 6 to 24 with
higher scores indicating greater anxiety.
a

N = 128. b n = 64 for each condition.

accurate and inaccurate subgroups, warning Pillai’s Trace V = .01, F(3, 60) = 0.26, p =
.88, no-warning Pillai’s Trace V = .01, F(3, 60) = 0.24 p = .87.
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An additional MANOVA was conducted using only participants who had
correctly identified the warning condition to which they were randomized. That is,
participants were eliminated from this analysis if they did not receive a warning but
erroneously reported that they had or if they did receive a warning but erroneously
reported that they had not. The multivariate effect of warning with this subsample
remained nonsignificant, Pillai’s Trace V = .01, F(3, 87) = 0.28, p = 84 . As can be seen
in Table 5, means and standard deviations for the three outcome measures in this
subsample were similar to those in the full sample shown in Table 4.
Hypothesis 3. Participants who are warned of impending bad news and those who are
not will demonstrate equivalent recall of the consultation content.
An independent samples t test was conducted to compare mean recall scores of
consultation content between the two groups (warning vs. no warning). As expected,
there was no difference in recall between those who received a warning (M = 5.73, SD =
0.51) and those who did not (M = 5.71, SD = 0.49), t(126) = 0.16, p = .86. These results
remained the same when participants who did not accurately recall the warning
manipulation were excluded. Those in the warning group (M = 5.85, SD = .36) were
similar to those in the no warning group (M = 5.82, SD = .39), t(89) = -0.42, p = .68.
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Positive Affect, Negative Affect, and Anxiety by
Warning Condition for Participants Who Accurately Identified the Warning
Manipulation Only
Warninga

No warningb

M

SD

M

SD

Prevideo Positive Affect

12.70

3.32

12.55

4.03

Postvideo Positive Affect

13.87

4.24

13.47

3.83

Prevideo Negative Affect

11.62

6.28

12.25

6.57

Postvideo Negative Affect

19.19

5.90

18.70

5.90

Prevideo Anxiety

13.58

6.09

14.23

5.56

Postvideo Anxiety

18.79

5.20

18.61

5.43

Positive Affect

Negative Affect

Anxiety

Note. Positive affect and negative affect scores each range from 5 to 25 with higher scores reflecting
greater positive (or negative) affect. Anxiety scores range from 6 to 24 with higher scores indicating greater
anxiety.
a

n = 47.

b

n = 44.
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Framing Hypotheses
The second set of data analyses addressed framing of the prognosis. These
analyses were more complex because they incorporate not only the differences in framing
(positive vs. negative) but also the previous manipulation of warning versus no warning.
Because the previous results indicated that the warning manipulation had no effect on
affect, anxiety, or recall, however, data were collapsed across warning condition for some
of the ensuing analyses.
Hypothesis 4. Participants who hear a positively framed prognosis and those who hear a
negatively framed prognosis will be equally accurate in their recall of the
statistical percentages given by the physician when explaining prognosis.
This hypothesis was examined using responses to two cued recall questions. For
instance, participants in the negative frame were asked “What are the chances that the
cancer will come back after treatment?” and “What percentage of people who are your
age and have this disease will die within 5 years?” Participants were asked to respond
with the associated statistic (percentage). Thus, to examine this hypothesis, recalled
percentages were compared with the actual percentages given by the physician in the
videotapes. Responses of “don’t know” or “can’t remember” were treated as inaccurate
recall.
Participants were first placed into one of three groups according to the total
number of statistics they recalled accurately (i.e., reported exactly correct): (a) those who
accurately recalled both prognostic statistics, (b) those who accurately recalled one
statistic but not the other, and (c) those who recalled neither prognostic statistic
accurately (Figure 1). A chi-square test of association was then conducted to determine if
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accuracy varied between the positive and negative framing conditions. As hypothesized,
there was no difference between the positive and negative framing groups on overall
recall of the prognostic statistics, χ2(2, N = 128) = 3.62, p = .83.
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Figure 1. Number of participants in positive and negative framing conditions who
accurately recalled the two prognostic statistics

Examining the two prognostic statistics separately produced similar results. The
number of people in each of the framing conditions who correctly recalled prognostic
statistic 1 and prognostic statistic 2 are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Number of participants in positive and negative framing conditions who
correctly recalled the two prognostic statistics. Statistic 1 presented the chances of
remaining cancer free after treatment (80%; positive frame) or the chances of the cancer
coming back (20%; negative frame). Statistic 2 presented the percentage of patients with
colon cancer who are still alive in 5 years (65%; positive frame) or the percentage of
patients with this disease who die within 5 years (35%; negative frame).

The number of people who accurately recalled the prognostic statistic and those
who did not did not differ significantly between the positive and negative framing groups
for the first prognostic statistic (i.e., chances of the cancer coming back vs. chances of
remaining cancer free), χ2(1, N = 128) = 0.32, p = .58, or for the second prognostic
statistic (i.e., percentage of patients who die within 5 years vs. percentage who are still
alive in 5 years), χ2(1, N = 128) = 2.02, p = .15. When, however, recall accuracy for the
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first and second statistics was compared within each framing condition using McNemar’s
exact test for correlated proportions, recall of the first statistic was similar to the second
for the negative frame condition (64 vs. 61%; p = .85), but recall accuracy for the second
statistic was considerably lower than recall of the first statistic in the positive frame
condition (69 vs. 48%, p = .02).
Additional analyses were conducted to explore any patterns that might help to
explain such a drop in accuracy in the positive framing group. The goal of these analyses
was to differentiate participants according to how close they were to recalling the
prognostic statistics accurately. First, participants were placed into one of five groups
based on the absolute value of the difference between the percentage they recalled and
the actual percentage that was provided by the physician. For these analyses,
participants who responded “don’t know” or “can’t remember” were placed into a
separate category from participants who recalled a statistic but did so inaccurately. The
five categories were: (a) accurate recall, (b) 1 to 10 percentage points off, (c) 11 to 20
percentage points off (this category included participants who reversed the two statistics
presented by the physician: 20 vs. 35% or 80 vs. 65%), (d) more than 20 percentage
points off, and (e) don’t know/can’t remember. The number of participants who fell into
each of the five categories is shown in Figure 3 for each framing condition for the first
statistic (top panel) and also for the second statistic (bottom panel).
For the first prognostic statistic (i.e., chances of remaining cancer free vs. chances
of the cancer coming back), there was no difference between the positive and negative
framing conditions across these five accuracy groups, χ2(4, N = 128) = 3.33, p = .51.
Likewise, for the second prognostic statistic there was also no significant difference
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between the positive and negative framing conditions (i.e., percentage of patients are still
alive in 5 years vs. percentage who patients who die within 5 years), though this effect
did approach significance, χ2(4, N = 128) = 8.72, p = .07.
Although recall accuracy did not differ significantly for either statistic based on
prognosis framing, inspection of the frequencies presented in the bottom panel of Figure
3 show a greater tendency for those in the positive condition to report statistics that were
1 to 15 percentage points off the second statistic they were given. Notably, 25% of
participants in the positive frame were 15 percentage points off, compared with 13% of
participants in the negative frame. Further examination of this subset revealed a
disproportionate number of participants in the positive condition who paired the first
percentage (80%) with the second phrase (percentage of people who are still alive in 5
years). Indeed, 20% (n = 13) of participants in the positive condition made this error,
compared with only 8% (n = 5) of participants in the negative condition who paired the
first percentage (20%) with the second phrase (percentage of people who die within 5
years). Participants in the positive condition were also somewhat less likely to respond
with “don’t know” or “can’t remember” than participants in the negative condition (3 vs.
11%).
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Figure 3. Recall accuracy for the first (top panel) and second (bottom panel) prognostic
statistics, by framing condition. “1-10 Off”=1 to 10 percentage points away from the
actual statistic presented by the physician’ “15 Off”= 15 percentage points away (e.g,
reversed the two statistics presented by the physician (80 vs. 65%; 20 vs. 35%); “20+
Off”= 20 percentage points away or more; “DK”=don’t know or can’t remember.
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In a final exploratory analysis, participants were placed into one of three groups
according to their recall of the second prognostic statistic: (a) accurate recall, (b)
optimistic recall (i.e., overestimated survival rate in the positive frame or underestimated
mortality rate in the negative frame), or (c) pessimistic recall (i.e., underestimated
survival rate in the positive frame or overestimated mortality rate in the negative frame).
For this analysis, participants who responded with “don’t know/can’t remember” were
excluded. A chi-square test comparing the number in each of these three categories in the
two framing conditions (Figure 4) was not significant, χ2(2, N = 119) = 4.37, p = .11;
however, more individuals in the positive condition provided an optimistic response

Number of participants

(33%; n = 21), compared with the negative condition (17%; n = 11).
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Figure 4. Number of participants in each framing condition whose recall of second
prognostic statistic was accurate, optimistic, or pessimistic. “Optimistic = overestimated
survival rate (positive frame) or underestimated mortality rate (negative frame).
“Pessimistic” = underestimated survival rate (positive frame) or overestimated mortality
rate (negative frame). Participants who responded with “don’t know/can’t remember”
were excluded.
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Hypothesis 5. Participants who hear a negatively framed prognosis will interpret the
news as worse than participants who hear a positively framed prognosis.
Means and standard deviations for participants’ ratings of the news after viewing
the prognosis video are presented in Table 6.

Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Bad News Ratings After Prognosis
Video by Condition
Positive frame

Negative frame

M

SD

M

SD

Warning

60.61

24.52

34.84

25.19

No warning

61.56

25.16

41.50

28.10

Total

61.09

24.65

38.17

26.68

Note. Scale ranges from 0 to 100, with lower scores indicating worse news ratings.

These 0 to 100 ratings of bad news were examined as the dependent variable in a two-bytwo factorial ANOVA with warning condition (warning vs. no warning) as one
independent variable and framing (positive vs. negative) as the other (Table 7). As
hypothesized, the ANOVA revealed a significant effect of framing. As illustrated in
Figure 5, individuals who heard the prognosis framed in negative terms rated the news as
significantly worse than those who heard a positively framed prognosis, F(1,124) = 25.28
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p < .001. There was no significant main effect for warning vs. no warning, nor for the
interaction of warning with framing.
Table 7
Analysis of Variance for Bad News Rating of Prognosis

Source of variation

df

F

Warning

1

0.70

Framing

1

25.28*

Warning x Framing

1

0.39

124

(664.57)

Error

η2

p

.41
.96

<.001
.53

Bad News Rating (0-100)

Note. Value enclosed in parentheses represents mean square error.
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Figure 5. Mean bad news ratings of prognosis (+/- 95% CI) in positive (n = 64) and
negative (n = 64) framing conditions. High score indicates good news.

67

Hypothesis 6. Participants who hear a negatively framed prognosis will report lower
positive affect and higher negative affect compared with participants who hear a
positively framed prognosis.
Hypothesis 7. Participants who hear a negatively framed prognosis will report higher
anxiety than participants who hear a positively framed prognosis.
Means and standard deviations for the affect and measures are presented in Table 8;
those for anxiety are in Table 9. Similar to the analyses for anxiety and affect for the
warning condition, prevideo variance was partialled out by calculating individual
unstandardized residuals for each of the three dependent variables (positive affect,
negative affect, anxiety). As before, postvideo scores were regressed on prevideo scores
in a linear regression for each of the measures. The estimates produced by each
regression equation were then subtracted from the variable’s observed postvideo scores.
The resultant residualized postvideo scores for positive affect, negative affect, and
anxiety were entered as dependent variables in a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA). Warning (warning vs. no warning) and framing (positive vs. negative
framing) were entered as between-subjects variables. Results of the MANOVA revealed
a significant multivariate effect of framing, Pillai’s Trace V = .142, F(3, 122) = 6.71, p <
.001, but not for warning, Pillai’s Trace V = .01, F(3, 122) = 0.30, p = .83, or for the
warning by framing interaction, Pillai’s Trace V = .04, F(3, 122) = 1.49, p = .22.
Inspection of the univariate tests for framing revealed that, as hypothesized, there
was a significant effect of framing on both negative affect, F(1, 124) = 19.48, p < .001,

η 2 = .13, and anxiety, F(1, 124) = 7.03, p = .009, η 2 =.05. Individuals who heard their
prognosis framed in a negative way were significantly more distressed after hearing this
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news than individuals who heard their prognosis framed in a positive way. This main
effect of framing is illustrated in Figure 6. There was no significant effect of framing on
positive affect, F(1, 124) = .01, p = .91.
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Table 8
Means and Standard Deviations of Positive and Negative Affect

Warning

No warning

Framing conditiona
M

SD

M

SD

Prevideo positive affect
Positive frame

14.59

4.94

13.00

4.48

Negative frame

13.44

4.47

14.95

4.17

Postvideo positive affect
Positive frame

14.56

4.77

13.21

4.13

Negative frame

13.91

3.99

14.09

4.17

Prevideo negative affect
Positive frame

16.25

5.94

15.63

6.45

Negative frame

14.06

5.91

15.78

5.73

Postvideo negative affect
Positive frameb

17.72

4.39

16.34

6.36

Negative frameb

18.13

5.99

20.38

5.27

Note. Positive affect and negative affect scores each range from 5 to 25 with higher
scores reflecting greater positive (or negative) affect.
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations of Anxiety

Warning

No warning

Framing conditiona
M

SD

M

SD

Prevideo anxiety
Positive frame

16.94

5.27

17.78

5.36

Negative frame

15.59

5.55

17.38

4.32

Postvideo anxiety
Positive frame

18.28

3.72

17.97

5.32

Negative frame

17.69

5.68

20.12

4.40

Note. Anxiety scores range from 6 to 24 with higher scores indicating greater anxiety.
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Figure 6. Effect of framing on residualized positive affect, negative affect and anxiety.
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Hypothesis 8. Participants who hear a negatively framed prognosis are expected to feel
less hopeful for the future than participants who hear a positively framed prognosis.
This hypothesis was tested in two separate analyses. The first analysis assessed
group differences in hope as indexed by the Life-Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R). For
this analysis, variance in prevideo LOT-R scores first was partialled out by calculating
unstandardized residuals for the postvideo LOT-R scores. Postvideo LOT-R scores were
regressed on prevideo LOT-R scores in a linear regression. The estimates produced by
this regression equation were then subtracted from the observed postvideo LOT-R scores
to calculate residuals. Finally, a univariate ANOVA was conducted, entering the
unstandardized residuals for postvideo LOT-R score as the dependent variable. The two
between-subjects independent variables were warning (warning vs. no warning) and
framing (positive vs. negative). Results from this ANOVA are presented in Table 10.
Contrary to hypothesis, the effect of framing was not statistically significant for
hopefulness, F(1, 124) = 1.44, p = .23. There was also no significant main effect of
warning, or warning by framing interaction.
Table 10
Analysis of Variance for Ratings of Hopefulness (LOT-R) by Condition
Source of variation

df

F

p

Warning

1

.17

.69

Framing

1

1.44

.23

Warning x Framing

1

.02

.89

124

(5.84)

Error

Note. Value enclosed in parentheses represents mean square error. LOT-R: Life
Orientation Test-Revised.
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In addition to this standardized questionnaire, hope was assessed by asking
participants to rate their feelings of hopefulness in nine domains as well as their overall
hopefulness for the future (Table 11). In a second analysis these 0 to 100 ratings of hope
were entered as dependent variables in a MANOVA. Again, the two between-subjects
variables were warning (warning vs. no warning) and framing (positive vs. negative
framing). Results revealed a significant multivariate effect of framing, Pillai’s Trace V =
.15, F(10, 112) = 2.01, p = .04; there was no significant effect of warning, Pillai’s Trace
V = .10, F(10, 112) = 1.23, p = .28, or interaction of warning by framing, Pillai’s Trace V
= .11, F(10, 112) = 2.41, p = .18.
Univariate tests revealed a significant effect of framing on four hopefulness items
as well as overall hopefulness (Table 12). For all of the statistically significant
differences, participants in the negative framing group reported feeling less hopeful than
participants in the positive framing group.
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Table 11
Means and Standard Deviations of Hopefulness Ratings by Condition

No warning

Warning
Framing condition
M

SD

M

SD

Live 1 year
Positive frame

90.25

20.43

96.45

10.82

Negative frame

92.71

18.01

98.23

3.78

Live 5 years
Positive frame

84.84

16.49

86.52

17.91

Negative frame

71.77

29.23

68.06

29.60

Live 10 years
Positive frame

67.03

28.59

66.29

28.28

Negative frame

52.10

28.77

50.48

35.60

Live longer than doctor expects
Positive frame

72.81

24.13

78.87

22.50

Negative frame

63.06

28.22

64.52

36.84

Receive treatment you need
Positive frame

89.53

16.48

97.42

5.61

Negative frame

95.29

10.86

83.06

28.33

Cancer never return
Positive frame

64.87

26.76

77.90

23.87

Negative frame

62.39

28.00

55.32

36.15
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Table 11 (continued)

Warning

No warning

Framing condition
M

SD

M

SD

Independent after treatment
Positive frame

77.97

22.43

87.26

16.53

Negative frame

78.39

22.45

75.97

30.29

Pain/symptoms well controlled
Positive frame

81.03

21.72

85.61

14.67

Negative frame

76.94

23.37

74.68

25.49

Be well cared for and supported
Positive frame

86.16

16.82

92.42

12.51

Negative frame

84.48

20.93

88.71

21.05

Hopefulness overall
Positive frame

79.81

20.43

85.81

16.99

Negative frame

72.52

23.27

67.68

29.75

Note. All ratings range from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater hopefulness
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Table 12
Univariate Tests for Hopefulness Ratings by Framing Condition
Source of variation

df

F

P

Live 1 year

3

1.86

.14

Live 5 years

3

4.61

.004

Live 10 years

3

2.65

.05

Live longer than doctor expects

3

2.11

.10

Receive treatment you need

3

4.21

.007

Cancer never return

3

3.27

.02

Independent after treatment

3

1.43

.24

Pain/symptoms well controlled

3

1.53

.21

Be well cared for and supported

3

1.12

.34

Hopefulness overall

3

3.72

.01
.
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Additional Research Questions
Personality and Health Information Style
Pearson correlations between the five personality factors (Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Intellect/Openness, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness) and the
residualized positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety scores after the warning video
are presented in Table 13. Although neuroticism was significantly, although modestly,
correlated with all three residualized dependent measures, extraversion was correlated
only with positive affect, and the remaining three personality factors were not
significantly correlated with any of the dependent measures. Similarly, health information
style, as measured by the KHOS-I, was uncorrelated with the three dependent measures.
Table 13
Intercorrelations Among Personality and Residualized Affect and Anxiety Scores after the
Warning Video
Positive affect

Negative affect

Anxiety

Neuroticism

-.28**

.23**

.18*

Extraversion

.18*

-.01

.009

Openness

-.03

-.03

-.02

Agreeableness

.05

.05

.02

Conscientiousness

.16

.07

-.03

KHOS-I

.06

.08

-.01

Warning Condition

.05

.10

.07

Note. KHOS-I= Krantz Health Opnion Scale-Information Subscale
*p < .05.**p < .01.
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Separate hierarchical regression analyses were conducted using residualized
positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety as dependent variables. I entered warning
condition (warning vs. no warning) in Step 1, the five personality factor scores as a set in
Step 2, followed by five two-way interactions (warning condition by each of the five
personality factors) in Step 3. In the regressions for positive affect and anxiety, none of
the three steps were statistically significant (results not shown). Results of the
hierarchical regression for negative affect are summarized in Table 14. Warning
condition in Step 1 explained no variance in negative affect, F(1, 126) = 1.20, p =.28.
When the five personality factors were entered in Step 2, the model explained 11% of the
variance in residualized negative affect following the warning video, F(5, 121) = 3.07, p
= .01; only Neuroticism was significant ( β =.42, p <.001). Finally, the five two-way
interactions entered in Step 3 explained no additional variance in residualized negative
affect, F(5,116) = .44, p = .82.
Similar results were revealed when these regression analyses were repeated
including health information style as measured by the KHOS-I along with the 5
personality factor scores in Step 2, as well as the interaction of warning condition and
health information style in Step 3. In the regressions for positive affect and anxiety, none
of the three steps were statistically significant (results not shown). For negative affect,
neither Step 1, F(1, 126) = 1.20, p = .28, nor Step 3 F(5, 116) = .44, p = .82, explained
any variance in residual negative affect. Step 2 explained 12% of the variance in
residualized negative affect; again, only Neuroticism was significant ( β =.42, p <.001).

79

Table 14
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Negative Affect for Warning
Video
Variable

B

SE B

β

Step 1

∆R 2
.01

Warning

.93

.84

.10

Step 2

.11*

Warning

1.02

.82

.11

Neuroticism

2.97

.78

.42***

Extraversion

1.34

.99

.14

Openness

-.47

.81

-.05

Agreeableness

.98

.98

.10

Conscientiousness

1.51

.93

.17

Step 3

.02

Warning

-19.19

18.11

-2.02

Neuroticism

2.63

1.03

.37*

Extraversion

1.95

1.60

.20

Openness

-.58

1.09

-.06

Agreeableness

.35

1.39

.03

Conscientiousness

.72

1.19

.08

Warning x Neuroticism

1.01

1.67

.23

Warning x Extraversion

-.84

2.09

-.30

Warning x Openness

-.02

1.69

-.01

Warning x Agreeableness

1.25

2.06

.52

Warning x Conscientiousness

2.06

1.96

1.68

*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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Another set of hierarchical regression analyses was conducted on the residual
affect and anxiety scores obtained after participants viewed the second video giving the
prognosis (i.e., the prognosis video). Framing condition was entered into Step 1; warning
condition was not included in the model because it yielded no significant main effects or
interaction effects in the previous analyses of framing. The five personality factors were
entered in Step 2, followed by two-way interactions of personality and framing in Step 3.
Pearson correlations between the five personality factors and the residualized
positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety scores from the prognosis video are presented
in Table 15. Neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness were significantly
correlated with positive affect, but none of the personality factors were correlated with
negative affect or anxiety. Framing condition was correlated only with negative affect.
Health information style was not correlated with any of the dependent measures.
Table 15
Intercorrelations Among Personality and Residualized Affect and Anxiety Scores for
Prognosis Video
Positive Affect

Negative Affect

Anxiety

Neuroticism

-.21*

.02

.08

Extraversion

.22*

.06

-.07

Openness

.03

-.12

-.01

Agreeableness

-.03

.04

.06

.28**

.05

-.09

KHOS-I

.12

.00

-.07

Framing Condition

.01

-.37**

-.23

Conscientiousness

*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 16 presents results for the regression analysis on residual positive affect for
the prognosis video. Framing condition in Step 1 did not predict positive affect, F(1,126)
= 0.01, p = .91. The personality factors entered in Step 2 explained 13% of the variance
in positive affect, F(5, 121) = 3.63, p = .004. Agreeableness ( β = -.20, p = 04) and
Conscientiousness ( β = .28, p = .006) were statistically significant. Finally, the
interactions of personality by framing entered in Step 3 explained no additional variance
in positive affect.
Table 17 presents results for the regression analysis on residual negative affect for
the prognosis video. Framing condition explained 13% of the variance in negative affect
in Step 1, F(1, 126) = 19.41, p < .001, but neither the addition of personality in Step 2,
F(5, 121) = 0.74, p = .60, nor the personality by framing interactions in Step 3 explained
any additional variance in negative affect, F(5, 116) = 0.76, p = .58.
Finally, the hierarchical regression analysis on anxiety for the prognosis video
(Table 18) produced results similar to those for negative affect. Framing condition in Step
1 explained 5% of the variance in anxiety, F(1, 126) = 6.93, p = .01. Neither the addition
of personality in Step 2, F(5, 121) = 0.67, p = .64, nor the personality by framing
interactions in Step 3 explained any additional variance in anxiety, F(5, 116) = 0.65, p =
.66.
All three of the regression analyses (positive affect, negative affect, and anxiety)
were repeated including health information style with the five personality factors in Step
2 as well as the health information style by framing interaction in Step 3. The addition of
health information style added nothing to the prediction of any of the dependent measures
(results not shown).
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Table 16
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Predicting Positive Affect after Prognosis Video
Variable

B

SE B

β

Step 1

∆R 2
.00

Framing

.05

.46

.01

Step 2

.13**

Framing

.07

.45

.01

Neuroticism

-.37

.42

-.10

Extraversion

.60

.53

.12

Openness

.16

.44

.03

Agreeableness

-1.11

.53

-.20*

Conscientiousness

1.39

.50

.28**

Step 3

.03

Framing

5.82

.45

.01

Neuroticism

-1.04

.42

-.10

Extraversion

.19

.53

.12

Openness

.83

.64

.17

Agreeableness

-1.27

.81

-.23

Conscientiousness

1.56

.70

.32*

Framing x Neuroticism

.93

.89

.46

Framing x Extraversion

.24

1.12

.15

-1.28

.90

-.85

Framing x Agreeableness

.21

1.08

.16

Framing x Conscientiousness

-.68

1.02

-1.02

Framing x Openness

*p < .05. **p < .01.
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Table 17
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Negative Affect for Prognosis
Video
Variable
Step 1

B

SE B

β

∆R 2

-2.90

.66

-.37***

.13***

Framing
Step 2

.03

Framing

-2.95

.68

-.37***

Neuroticism

1.01

.64

.17

Extraversion

1.02

.81

.13

Openness

-.66

.66

-.09

Agreeableness

.12

.81

.01

Conscientiousness

.46

.76

.06

Step 3

.03

Framing

-22.04

15.02

-2.78

Neuroticism

.32

1.08

.05

Extraversion

-.18

1.15

-.02

Openness

-.62

.97

-.08

Agreeableness

-.68

1.23

-.08

Conscientiousness

.51

1.07

.07

Framing x Neuroticism

1.06

1.36

.34

Framing x Extraversion

2.78

1.70

1.18

Framing x Openness

.33

1.37

.14

Framing x Agreeableness

1.27

1.64

.62

Framing x Conscientiousness

.18

1.55

.18

**p =.01. *** p < .001.
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Table 18
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Anxiety for Prognosis Video
Variable

B

SE B

β

Step 1

∆R 2
.05*

Framing

-1.42

.54

-.23**

Step 2

.03

Framing

-1.47

.55

-.24***

Neuroticism

.43

.52

.09

Extraversion

-.14

.66

-.02

Openness

.10

.54

.02

Agreeableness

.77

.66

.11

Conscientiousness

-.56

.62

-.09

Step 3

.03

Framing

-1.18

12.33

-.19

Neuroticism

.16

.89

.03

Extraversion

-1.13

.94

-.18

Openness

.51

.80

.08

Agreeableness

.47

1.01

.07

Conscientiousness

-.10

.88

-.02

Framing x Neuroticism

.28

1.12

.11

Framing x Extraversion

2.22

1.40

1.21

Framing x Openness

-.70

1.12

-.40

Framing x Agreeableness

.36

1.34

.23

Framing x Conscientiousness

-.96

1.27

-1.19

* p < .05. **p =.01. *** p < .001.
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Two final hierarchical regression analyses were conducted on the hopefulness
ratings obtained after participants viewed the second video giving the prognosis (i.e., the
prognosis video). As in the previous regression analyses, framing condition was entered
in Step 1, the five personality factors were entered in Step 2, and the personality by
framing interactions were entered in Step 3. In the first analysis residualized LOT-R
scores served as the dependent variable. The dependent variable in the second analysis
was the mean of the ten 0-100 hopefulness ratings.
Pearson correlations between the five personality factors and the residualized
LOT-R scores and average hope ratings are presented in Table 19. Neuroticism,
extraversion, and agreeableness were significantly correlated with average hope, but none
of the personality factors were correlated with LOT-R scores. Framing condition was
correlated only with average hope. Health information style was not correlated with any
of the dependent measures.
Table 19
Intercorrelations Between Personality, Residualized LOT-R and Hope Ratings for Prognosis Video
LOT-R

Average hope

Neuroticism

.15

-.42***

Extraversion

-.04

.29**

Openness

-.01

.09

Agreeableness

-.03

.18*

Conscientiousness

-.12

.16

KHOS-I

.11

.03

Framing condition

-.11

.26**

*p<.05. **p < .01. ***p<.001.
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For the regression on residual LOT-R scores, none of the three steps were
statistically significant (results not shown). Table 20 presents results for the regression
analysis on average hopefulness ratings (across 10 domains) following the prognosis
video. Framing condition in Step 1 explained 7% of the variance in hopefulness, F (1,
126) = 9.41, p = .003. The personality factors entered in Step 2 explained an additional
23% of the variance in hope, F (5, 121) = 7.95, p < .001. Only Neuroticism ( β = -.44, p <
.001) made a unique contribution. Finally, the personality by framing interactions entered
in Step 3 explained no additional variance in hope F (5, 116) = 0.93, p < .46.
When these two regression analyses (for LOT-R and average hope) were repeated
including health information style with the five personality factors in Step 2 as well as the
health information style by framing interaction in Step 3, the results of these analyses
were unchanged. The addition of health information style added nothing to the prediction
of either of the dependent measures (results not shown).
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Table 20
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Mean Hope for Prognosis Video
Variable

B

SE B

β

Step 1

∆R 2
.07**

Framing

8.87

2.89

.26**

Step 2

.23***

Framing

10.66

2.61

.32***

Neuroticism

-11.21

2.48

-.44***

Extraversion

2.51

3.11

.07

Openness

2.18

2.55

.07

Agreeableness

2.76

3.11

.08

Conscientiousness

-2.74

2.92

-.09

Step 3

.03

Framing

44.27

57.85

1.32

Neuroticism

-12.29

4.17

-.49**

Extraversion

5.20

4.42

.15

Openness

3.92

3.75

.12

Agreeableness

6.03

4.72

.17

Conscientiousness

-5.16

4.11

-.16

Framing x Neuroticism

1.63

5.24

.12

Framing x Extraversion

-8.46

6.56

-.85

Framing x Openness

-3.80

5.26

-.39

Framing x Agreeableness

-5.42

6.31

-.63

Framing x Conscientiousness

3.16

5.9

.73

Note. . Dependent variable is mean of ten 0-100 ratings of hopefulness.
**p < .01. ***p<.001.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION
This dissertation investigated the effects of forecasting bad news and framing
prognosis when conveying a life-limiting diagnosis of colon cancer. An experimental
videotape paradigm was used to maximize the capacity for discerning differences in
individuals’ perceptions and affective responses following specific communication
behaviors. I hypothesized that warning of impending bad news would reduce subsequent
psychological distress but have no effect on recall of consultation content. Similarly,
framing prognosis in terms of positive outcomes such as treatment success and survival
was expected to produce less distress and greater hope than framing prognosis in terms of
negative outcomes such as cancer reoccurrence and death. I also hypothesized that
negative framing would negatively bias subjective perceptions of the prognosis but not
affect the recall of prognostic statistics.
Effect of Warning of Impending Bad News
Results of this study did not support the hypothesis that warning an individual
about upcoming bad news reduced psychological distress. Participants in both warning
and no-warning conditions reported similar negative affect and anxiety after watching a
video in which a doctor gave them a diagnosis of colon cancer. Thus, receiving a warning
immediately prior to the diagnosis had no effect.
Several factors may help explain why warning did not affect psychological
distress in this study. The most obvious explanation is that the type of warning
recommended in current guidelines (and used in the current study) is ineffective.
Although obvious, this explanation is not simple and is composed of several potential
contributing factors. For instance, it is possible that the brevity of the warning statement
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prevents individuals from detecting the warning. Written in the form recommended by
the SPIKES protocol (Baile et al., 2000), the warning used in this study was brief (i.e.,
“I’m afraid I have bad news”). As a manipulation check, participants were asked whether
the doctor had said anything before telling them they had cancer to let them know that
bad news was coming. A considerable proportion (29%) of participants did not correctly
identify the condition to which they had been randomized. Specifically, 20 participants in
the no-warning condition erroneously thought they received a warning, and 17
participants in the warning condition did not realize they had received a warning.
Nonetheless, analyses repeated with the subset of participants who did correctly identify
their condition did not find a significant effect of warning. Furthermore, within each
condition, there was no difference in negative affect or anxiety between participants who
identified the manipulation and those who did not. This suggests that the nonsignificant
effect of warning on psychological distress cannot be attributed to failure to detect the
warning.
Though the problem with the warning does not appear to be one of detection, it is
still possible that the brevity of the warning limited its effectiveness. A warning so brief
may simply not be powerful enough to have an effect on affect or anxiety. This is
especially true when one considers that the warning statement was presented immediately
before the news itself, with only a momentary pause between the warning and the
physician’s diagnostic statement. A more potent (i.e., lengthy, explicit) warning might be
more effective.
Above and beyond the characteristics of the warning itself, it is possible that other
elements of the physician’s presentation in the videos contributed to the nonsignificant
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findings. For instance, any effect of the warning statement may have been diluted by the
identical style and content of the physician’s comments in both conditions. In an effort to
isolate the effect of the warning phrase, I used the same video for both conditions, with
the warning phrase, “I’m afraid I have bad news,” simply edited out of the no-warning
video. This ensured that the physician used the same tone of voice and words in the nowarning video as he did in the warning video. Although this strategy increased
experimental control, in actual clinical settings warning is likely not only about the words
being used. Rather, patients may discern (and perhaps even seek out) other cues to detect
that bad news is coming, such as a physician’s tone of voice, pacing of the conversation,
or other aspects of the physician’s behavior. Thus, by using the same tone in both
videos—a tone that sought to convey a professional sense of caring concern—the effect
of warning may have been mitigated.
Similarly, both the warning and no-warning videos began with the doctor
reviewing the patient’s symptoms and steps taken thus far to identify the cause of those
symptoms. Although intended to ensure that doctor and patient had a shared
understanding of what had happened thus far, inspection of the qualitative response to the
question about whether the physician let them know that bad news was coming suggests
that this preface may have been interpreted in other ways. Indeed, several of the
participants in the no-warning condition who erroneously thought they had received
warning noted that the doctor’s detailed review of procedures and symptoms let them
know that “the news was not good.” In other words, these participants felt that if the
news had not been bad, the physician would have come out immediately and said, “I have
good news,” or “Your test results came back negative.” Anecdotally, a few even
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mentioned that most physicians have nurses call on the telephone to report when test
results are good, so that even being called into the office to receive test results could be
interpreted as a warning.
Thus, if many participants in this study perceived the physician’s lengthy review
of procedures to be a sign that bad news was coming, then this study in essence compared
two conditions with almost identical warnings (except for the brief one-sentence warning
that was actually being tested). This could explain why no effect of warning was found.
These results imply that physicians may want to be aware of the unintentional effect such
an opening could have on patients, even in the absence of an explicit warning statement.
Future research could address this possibility directly using a videotape paradigm with
two conditions: one in which the physician begins with a review of procedures similar to
the script in this study, compared with one in which the physician begins with the
diagnosis, omitting both the review and the explicit warning statement. Alternatively, to
test directly the effect of the warning statement evaluated in this study, it may be
advisable to remove the summary of procedures from both conditions, an approach that
has not been taken in prior videotape research (Fogarty et al., 1999).
These explanations point to the possibility that warning may indeed have an effect
on psychological distress, although not in the form presented in this study. This
conclusion seems probable, given previous research showing an effect of warning in
other contexts (Dutt-Gupta et al., 2007). For instance, it is reasonable to think that an
earlier warning of the possibility of bad news, such as telling a patient that the polyp
being biopsied could be cancerous, may be more likely to affect psychological distress
than warning of confirmed bad news immediately before delivering that news
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(Friedrichsen & Strang, 2003). This kind of warning of possibility, which was proposed
in at least one set of guidelines (Girgis, Sanson-Fisher & Schofield, 1999), would be
more consistent with the Bad News Response Model that has been described in previous
research (Sweeny & Shepperd, 2007), as it would allow a patient to “brace for the worst.”
According to this model, individuals will experience less negative affect at the receipt of
bad news if they are expecting that news. In one study testing this theory, participant
expectations of receiving positive test results (i.e., bad news) were manipulated by
informing them that people like themselves were either at high risk or low risk for the
medical condition being tested. Unlike the current study, a period of approximately 3
minutes elapsed between the receipt of this warning and the provision of bad news,
presumably enabling participants in the high-risk condition to consider the warning and
mentally prepare themselves for bad news. Results showed that participants who
expected the bad news had lower negative affect after receiving the test results than
participants who did not expect the bad news (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002). Such mental
preparation was not possible with the warning examined in this study due to its
immediate proximity to the bad news provision itself, which may help to explain why the
warning had no effect. Future research could explore whether a warning consistent with
the Bad News Response Model would reduce negative affect within the context of
receiving a cancer diagnosis.
A final consideration in explaining the nonsignificant effect of warning on
psychological distress is that the term “warning” may be a misnomer when describing the
communication strategy recommended in current guidelines and examined in this study.
In their SPIKES protocol, which provides recommendations about how to deliver bad
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news, Baile and colleagues (2000) claimed that warning “may lessen the shock that can
follow the disclosure of bad news and may facilitate information processing” (p. 306).
This seems unlikely for the reasons just described, most notably that the warning they
recommend is too brief and too close in time to the actual provision of bad news for
participants to “prepare for the worst.” Nevertheless, expressing that one is “afraid” to
say that he has bad news or is “sorry to tell you that…” as the SPIKES protocol
specifically recommends may contribute to reduced psychological distress when
conveyed with a warm tone of voice and paired with other similar sentiments both before
and after the provision of bad news. This potential effect seems more likely to be due to
an effect of compassion rather than due to the patient actually feeling warned—that is,
notified, alerted, or cautioned prior to the receipt of bad news. Indeed, the warning “I’m
afraid I have bad news” is strikingly similar to some of the empathic statements
recommended in the SPIKES protocol (e.g., “I’m sorry to have to tell you this,” or “I
was also hoping for a better result”). Such statements, when offered with a tone of
warmth and caring concern, may help the patient to feel supported and reassured (Baile et
al., 2000). Hence offering such a brief warning statement may be just one element in a
compassionate delivery of bad news, which as a broader construct has been shown to
reduce patient anxiety (Fogarty et al., 1999).
Warning also failed to have an effect on recall of consultation content, consistent
with predictions. Researchers have suggested that improved recall should be mediated by
reduced anxiety (Baile et al., 2000; Fogarty et al., 1999). Since I did not find a reduction
in anxiety in the warning condition, this may explain why there was no difference in
recall of video content. Fogarty and colleagues (1999) did not find improvements in
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recall, despite achieving a significant reduction in anxiety in their videotape study of the
effect of empathy when delivering bad news. Indeed, reduced anxiety was actually
associated with worse recall in that study, perhaps because participants felt more calm
and trusting of the empathic physician and therefore were less scrutinizing of the
information he provided. This is unlikely the case in the current study because physician
empathy was held constant and patient anxiety did not vary across the two conditions;
however, it should also be noted that the memory load for the consultation in this study
was fairly low compared with an actual doctor’s visit. The warning video was only 2
minutes long, and questions that assessed recall were fairly simple and straightforward
(e.g., “Did the doctor tell you that have colon cancer?” Yes/No; “Did the doctor
recommend that you have chemotherapy?” Yes/No). Consequently, a ceiling effect
existed for recall. Seventy-five percent of the sample recalled all 6 items correctly, an
additional 23% recalled 5 of 6 items correctly, and the remaining 2% recalled 4 of 6
items correctly. Given that research has shown longer consultations to be associated with
worse information recall (Jansen et al., 2008), future research should examine this
hypothesis following a consultation that is more representative of the length and memory
load of an actual doctor’s visit to ensure that warning does, indeed, have no effect on
patients’ ability to recall the information provided.
Effect of Framing Prognostic Information
After receiving a cancer diagnosis, patients typically are told about what to expect
in the future. Information about their prognosis is frequently included in this discussion,
and in many cases represents a second dose of bad news. In a second video the effect of
framing this prognostic information (i.e., expressing prognosis in terms of positive
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outcome vs. negative outcomes) was examined. Several hypotheses regarding the effects
of framing were tested. The first examined the effect of framing on accuracy for the
statistical percentages given by the physician when explaining prognosis. As
hypothesized, there was no difference between participants who heard a positively
framed prognosis and those who heard a negatively framed prognosis. In both conditions,
approximately 40% of participants recalled both statistics accurately, 40% recalled one
statistic accurately, and approximately 20% recalled neither statistic accurately. Although
recall has not been addressed in research on prognosis framing in the past, these findings
are generally consistent with two studies of the effect of message framing on breast selfexamination. Both studies found equivalent recall between framing conditions after
reading an information pamphlet (Myerowitz & Chaiken, 1987) and watching an
informational video (Brenes, 1998).
Although I predicted no differences in recall between framing conditions, an
interesting trend that contradicts my original hypothesis should be noted. The physician
in the video explained the patient’s prognosis with two statistics. He first presented the
patient’s chances of remaining cancer free after treatment (80%; positive frame) or
chances of the cancer returning (20%; negative frame). He preceded this statement with
“fortunately” in the positively framed video, and “unfortunately” in the negatively framed
video. Then, in a second statement, he presented the percentage of patients “who are your
age and have this disease” who are still alive in 5 years (65%; positive frame), or who die
within 5 years (35%; negative frame). Among those who heard the negatively framed
prognosis, participants were equally likely to recall the first and second statistics
correctly (64.1% vs. 60.9%). In contrast, among participants who heard the positively
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framed prognosis, the proportion of accurate recall dropped significantly, from 68.8% for
the first statistic to only 48.8% for the second statistic (i.e., the percentage of people who
are still alive in 5 years).
Inspection of individually recalled percentages suggests that people in the positive
condition were somewhat more likely to pair the first percentage (80%) with the second
phrase (percentage of people who are still alive in 5 years). Indeed, only 8% of
participants in the negative condition made this error, while 20% in the positive condition
did. Notably, participants who made this error unintentionally overestimated their
chances of surviving 5 years; that is, they interpreted their prognosis to be more
optimistic than it actually was. Consistent with this pattern (though not statistically
significant), participants in the positive condition were somewhat more likely to be
overly optimistic when recalling the second prognostic statistic: 33% of individuals in the
positive condition overestimated the 5-year survival rate, but only 17% in the negative
condition underestimated the 5-year mortality rate.
A tendency for patients to overestimate their prognosis in the positive direction
has been reported in previous studies (Mackillop et al., 1988) and is concerning because
it may lead patients to pursue more aggressive treatment than they would if their
understanding of prognosis was more accurate (Weeks et al., 1998). Although the trends
in recall observed in this study are only preliminary, the notion that memory for the
second statistic might decline after hearing the first positively framed statistic is
consistent with research showing that positive mood tends to reduce attention to detail,
deferring to more heuristic-type processing (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). Thus
after hearing the first percentage along with the physician’s construal of the news as good
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(given his use of the term “fortunately”), participants may have been less scrutinizing of
the prognostic information, possibly contributing to the observed decline in recall. As one
participant who was unable to recall the second statistic correctly wrote, “80% words
were nice to hear.” Though largely conjecture at this stage, this explanation could be
strengthened by further research replicating the observed trends at a statistically
significant level. To test this proposition, more could be done to cast the positive frame as
“good news” and the negative frame as “bad news.” For instance, the physician could
use a more enthusiastic or optimistic tone of voice in the positive frame and use a more
pessimistic tone in the negative frame. In addition, inserting comments such as “I have
great news” or “I have very bad news” could further enhance the manipulation and help
to determine whether positive mood is associated with worse prognosis recall.
Although framing was not expected to affect objective recall of the statistical
percentages, it was hypothesized to influence subjective interpretations of that prognostic
information. Results of the current study provide support for this hypothesis. Despite the
fact that the ultimate outcomes presented in the two conditions were identical in meaning,
individuals who heard the negatively framed prognosis rated the news as significantly
worse than those who heard the same news framed in a positive way. The difference in
the 0 to 100 ratings of this news was substantial. Further, if 50, the midpoint of the scale,
represents neutral (i.e., the news is viewed as neither good nor bad), then individuals who
heard the negative frame rated the news as bad, whereas those who heard the positive
frame rated the news as good. This finding is consistent with previous research showing
that positive framing increases patients’ willingness to accept medical treatment by
manipulating perceptions of risk of developing side effects (e.g., Gurm & Litaker, 2000;
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O’Connor, 1989). By prefacing the prognosis with the term “fortunately” and
emphasizing positive outcomes such as surviving and remaining cancer free, the
physician in the positive video supported an optimistic interpretation of the news. On the
other hand, by introducing the prognosis with “unfortunately” and emphasizing negative
outcomes, such as the chances of the cancer returning and patients dying, the physician
manipulated perceptions of the news to be more pessimistic, even though the negative
outcomes were no more likely to occur in the negative condition than in the positive
condition. These results suggest that health care professionals would be advised to
consider the potential effect subtle changes in their language might have on patient
perceptions of what to expect in the future.
Given the substantial difference in subjective ratings of the prognostic
information, it is perhaps not surprising that framing also had a significant effect on
psychological distress. As hypothesized, after hearing the negatively framed prognosis,
individuals reported significantly greater negative affect and significantly higher anxiety
compared with individuals who heard the positively framed prognosis. This difference
was likely due to the focus on treatment failure and the greater salience of death in the
negative frame. However, contrary to hypothesis, individuals in the two groups did not
differ in positive affect. Indeed, it appears that positive affect was somewhat elevated in
both groups prior to watching the prognosis video and remained unchanged in both
groups after hearing the prognostic information. This pattern of results is consistent with
prior theory and research and reflects a long-term debate regarding the dimensional
structure of affect.
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Although one might assume positive affect is synonymous with pleasantness (i.e.,
content, happy, pleased), and negative affect with unpleasantness (i.e., blue, sad), these
common interpretations are not compatible with the constructs supposedly measured by
the PANAS (Feldman, 1995). Instead, the PANAS was designed to assess two specific
and theoretically orthogonal domains: Negative Affect, which is described as one’s level
of “subjective distress and unpleasurable engagement” (Watson et al., 1988, p.1063), and
Positive Affect, which “reflects the extent to which one feels enthusiastic, active, and
alert” (p.1063). Feldman Barrett and Russell (1998) have argued that these specialized
definitions reflect the fact that the PANAS subscales each represent a combination of two
bipolar constructs: pleasantness (positive vs. negative) and arousal (high vs. low). As
such, the negative subscale contains only items that are high in both unpleasant affect and
arousal, and therefore may be better labeled unpleasant activation. Similarly, the
positive subscale contains only items high in pleasantness and arousal, and may therefore
be referred to as unpleasant activation. Using empirical methods, Feldman Barrett and
Russell demonstrated that combining pleasantness and arousal in one subscale and
unpleasantness and arousal in a second subscale produces two scales that are almost
completely uncorrelated, even though each of the individual constructs (i.e., pleasantness
and activation) are bipolar and hence negatively correlated.
If the PANAS subscales do indeed measure orthogonal constructs, then one
should not necessarily expect a reduction in positive affect to accompany an increase in
negative affect. Consistent with this, previous research has shown that stressful events
and unpleasant experiences are generally associated with high negative affect but not
associated with positive affect (e.g., Warr, Barter, & Brownbridge, 1983). In the current
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study, receiving prognostic information within the context of cancer, at least when the
chance of survival is less than 100%, is likely interpreted as an unpleasant event,
regardless of how that news is framed. Hence, presenting prognosis using a positive
frame may reduce the negativity of the news compared to the negative frame, but does
not change the fact that the news is fundamentally bad.
From a behavioral perspective, hearing prognosis in either frame is presumably
threatening and therefore activates the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS; Gray, 1990),
which regulates avoidance behavior and is associated with negative affect (Carver &
White, 1994). Describing prognosis in terms of the chances of survival (i.e., positive
framing) likely enhances the extent to which individuals feel that they will be able to
avoid dying, and therefore is associated with less increase in negative affect compared to
hearing the chances of death (i.e., negative framing). In contrast, positive framing does
not likely activate the reciprocal Behavioral Approach System (BAS; Gray, 1990), which
is sensitive to reward signals, regulates approach (i.e., goal-oriented) behavior and is
associated with positive affect. Consequently, the differential effect of framing is
observed in the change in negative affect, but not in positive affect.
In a final hypothesis the effect of framing on feelings of hopefulness was
examined. Although this effect has not been previously investigated, one of the main
reasons physicians report employing positive outcome framing is to preserve patient hope
in the face of bad news (Lamont & Christakis, 2001; Rodriguez et al., 2008). The
hypothesis that positive framing would be associated with greater hopefulness than
negative framing was assessed in two separate analyses, producing mixed results. When
hopefulness was measured using a modified version of the LOT-R (Scheier et al., 1994),
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there was no difference between the two framing conditions. When participants rated
their hopefulness in 10 domains with a 0 to 100 scale, individuals who heard the positive
prognosis reported significantly greater hope, both overall and with respect to specific
aspects of their future.
It appears that the two scales measuring different constructs. The LOT-R was
originally designed to measure optimism, a personality disposition that is not thought to
be modifiable over time. Due to the absence of any preexisting state measures of
hopefulness, this scale was chosen based on the close relationship between the constructs
of optimism and hope, as well as the previous use of the LOT-R to track changes in the
construct in psychological intervention studies with cancer patients (Antoni et al., 2001).
Given its intended use as a trait measure, the LOT-R was composed of general items
written in broad terms (e.g., “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best”). In contrast,
the hopefulness ratings developed for this study were more specific and related directly to
the cancer scenario (e.g., “Based on the news the doctor gave you, how hopeful are you
that you will live 10 years?”).
Furthermore, there was a subtle discrepancy in the two scales’ instructions, which
was necessary to make the directions compatible with wording of the items in each scale.
Although both measures asked participants to think about what they had just been told,
the hope ratings specifically inquired about feelings of hope “based on the news the
doctor gave you,” whereas the LOT-R instructions stated: “You were diagnosed with
colon cancer, have had surgery, and the doctor has just told you about treatment and what
you can expect in the future. Putting yourself in that mindset, please indicate how much
you agree with each of the statements below.” In short, the LOT-R likely captured trait
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levels of optimism/hopefulness, which could be expected to remain stable in the face of
bad news. In contrast, the items written specifically for this study likely reflected
hopefulness in the moment, and this state construct could be expected to change over
time, as observed in this study.
Taken together, these results suggest that framing the prognosis may not have an
impact on patients’ general outlook on life but may influence their hopefulness regarding
certain aspects of their future. Yet even among the subjective ratings of hopefulness,
framing appeared to sway hopefulness in some domains but not others. For instance,
participants who received the negative prognosis were less hopeful than those who heard
the positive prognosis about their chances of living 5 years, 10 years, and living longer
than the doctor expected. They were also less hopeful that the cancer would never return.
On the other hand, framing did not appear to affect hope of living 1 year, receiving
needed treatment or good pain and symptom control, regaining independence, or being
generally well cared for. These results are consistent with the idea that the framing does
not have such a dramatic or all-encompassing effect as to cause individuals to be
universally pessimistic (or optimistic) about their future. The negative framing does,
however, appear to reduce feelings of hopefulness relative to the positive frame,
particularly in domains specifically mentioned in the physician’s discussion of prognosis.
Whether the effect of a physician’s communication approach on hope tends to be
transient or enduring is a question that could be explored in future longitudinal studies of
patient functioning.
Notably, if the 0 to 100 hopefulness ratings were interpreted as statistical
percentages, then individuals in both framing groups tended to be more hopeful than
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would be expected if they based their ratings solely on the prognostic information
presented by the doctor. For example, the 5-year survival rate according to the physician
was 65%, yet participants in the positive condition rated their hopefulness for surviving 5
years at approximately 86, and participants in the negative condition rated their
hopefulness at approximately 70. Furthermore, despite tremendous variability in these
ratings, participants in both conditions could generally be described as quite hopeful, as
the average ratings were above 50 in every domain assessed. Though it is conjectural to
interpret hopefulness ratings as statistical percentages, this finding is consistent with
previous research showing that individuals generally display an optimistic bias when
envisioning the personally relevant future (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein, 1989). For
instance, one study found that individuals tend to rate themselves as less susceptible to
developing cancer compared with their peers (Clarke, Lovegrove, Williams &
Machperson, 2000).
Individual Differences in Personality and Health Information Style
That feelings of hope were not determined entirely by physician comments
highlights the fact that other individual differences may contribute to a patient’s response
to bad news. Many physicians note that they consider a patient’s personality in their
decision about how to deliver bad news (Ptacek et al., 2001), and a patient’s personality
and previous experiences may influence the subjective interpretation of and response to
bad news. Yet it remains unclear what personality factors may be relevant in predicting a
patient’s response. In a preliminary effort to clarify this, possible relationships were
explored among the Big Five personality factors, health information style, and
psychological distress and hopefulness.
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Results from these exploratory analyses produced several significant findings. In
the case of testing the effect of warning, the only significant association was between
Neuroticism and negative affect. Specifically, people who were more neurotic reported
more negative affect after receiving a diagnosis of colon cancer. This finding is consistent
with previous research demonstrating a close relationship between these two measures.
For instance, Rusting and Larsen (1997) found that Neuroticism predicted negative affect
following an unpleasant imagery task similar to the current study, in which participants
imagined a series of bad scenarios including a friend dying of cancer. By definition
neuroticism “represents the proneness of the individual to experience unpleasant and
disturbing emotions” (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p.46), and some researchers have argued
that neuroticism should be termed negative emotionality based its robust relationship with
negative affect (Tellegen, 1985). From a clinical perspective, this finding affirms many
health care professionals’ inclination to consider a patient’s personality when delivering
bad news. Knowing that a patient’s underlying personality tends to be highly neurotic, a
clinician may prepare for the possibility of a more intense negative emotional reaction
and thus provide additional support, assist with reframing, or offer psychological services
as necessary to help the patient cope. In contrast to the findings for Neuroticism, neither
the other four personality factors nor health information style predicted negative affect.
Further, there were no significant relationships between any of these variables and
positive affect or anxiety.
A slightly different pattern of results emerged when individuals heard news about
prognosis. Though Neuroticism was correlated with both negative affect and anxiety in
this scenario, it did not uniquely add to the prediction of either outcome after taking into
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account the effect of framing. In this scenario, however, positive affect, which was not
affected by framing, was predicted by both Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Thus it
appears individuals who were more good-natured, meticulous, and precise felt more
enthusiastic following the second consultation, possibly reflecting a preference among
these individuals for the type of detailed information about prognosis they had just
received.
Although these associations are intriguing, their magnitudes were relatively small,
and the findings are preliminary and in need of replication. Furthermore, the NEO
yielded relatively few significant associations, and the health information style
questionnaire failed to make any significant predictions. The null results associated with
the latter questionnaire may be attributed to poor psychometric properties, as the factor
structure of the Krantz Health Opinion Survey has been criticized in the past (RobinsonWhelen & Storandt, 1992). Even with this consideration, a large amount of variance in
each of the outcome variables is left unexplained. Consequently, a follow-up study with
larger samples and additional measures of patient attitudes, preferences, and personalities
could provide greater insight into the relationship between individual differences and
physician communication styles in predicting responses to bad news. In addition to
developing a more psychometrically sound measure of health information style, it may be
useful for future research to assess variables such as individual patient communication
style, specific preferences for bad news communication (e.g., level of detail, importance
of emotional support; Lobb et al., 2001), as well fear of death and dying (e.g., Lester &
Abdel-Khalek, 2003). Anecdotally, it may also be prudent for future studies to collect
ratings of physician attributes such as empathy, caring, dominance, competence, and
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trustworthiness (e.g., Schmid Mast, Hall & Roter, 2008). Despite the fact that the
physician presentation style was held constant across the four conditions, numerous
participants in this study commented on these traits, conveying a wide variety of
intensely held opinions about the physician that could be predictive of affective responses
following the consultation.
Limitations
One major limitation of this study is its generalizability. The videotape paradigm
permitted a level of experimental control that has been absent in the majority of previous
research in this area, but there are obvious differences between this approach and
studying communication as it naturally unfolds. Participants in this study were not
actually receiving a diagnosis of cancer, and there could be differences in responses to
this imaginary scenario and receiving such bad news in real life. Despite this limitation,
every effort was taken to make the scenario feel as realistic as possible, including filming
the video in an actual physician’s office with a real doctor, having the physician speak
directly into the camera as if he were talking to the participant, and setting up the testing
rooms to look like a doctor’s waiting room and examination room. Furthermore,
participants generally reported that they felt the study scenario was realistic, that they
could imagine themselves in the scenario, and that they believed that they would respond
quite similarly if the situation presented in the study were actually happening to them.
The fact that there were changes in negative affect and anxiety and differences in hope
ratings as a function of the framing manipulation further suggests that participants took
the experiment seriously and found it was realistic.
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In addition, the videotape paradigm precluded any conversation between the
participant and the doctor, which limited the realism of the experience and also prevented
participants from asking questions and doctors from tailoring their delivery to each
person. These restrictions are notable because patients better remember consultation
information when they ask questions and actively engage in discussion with the physician
(Brown et al., 2001). Moreover, evidence suggests that tailoring the amount of
information provided according to the level of information a patient desires is associated
with lower anxiety and better problem-focused coping during a subsequent medical
procedure (Kiesler & Auerbach, 2006; Ludwick-Rosenthal & Neufeld, 1993). Such
tailoring, however, could not be incorporated into the physician’s presentation in the
current study.
Related to this limitation, although every effort was made to balance experimental
control with realism, it was impossible to include some of the other elements
recommended in the SPIKES protocol (Baile et al., 2000). For example, assessing how
much the patient wants to know and checking for patient understanding throughout the
conversation are likely to be important elements of delivering bad new that could not be
incorporated into this study’s videotape methodology. Future research could confirm
whether these strategies increase comprehension and decrease psychological distress, as
they are purported to do.
These limitations also highlight an inherent challenge in conducting research on
communicating bad news: the reductive methodology necessary for determining causality
with respect to specific communication strategies may oversimplify what takes place in
an actual healthcare conversation between a doctor and patient. For instance, although a
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simple six-word warning phrase may not affect psychological distress on its own, when
used with other communication strategies it may in fact lead to reduced anxiety. This
challenge will be best addressed by continuing to conduct research using a range of
methodologies—experimental and correlational, lab-based and naturalistic—
so that the weaknesses of one approach may be balanced by the strengths of another.
Another limitation to the generalizability of these results is the age range of the
participants. Participants were required to be at least 50 years of age because the colon
cancer scenario they were asked to imagine was expected to be most salient for this age
group. Inclusion of adults of all ages in future research will permit the investigation of
age as an independent variable in predicting response to bad news. For instance, one
study reported that older cancer patients recalled less information following an initial
oncology consultation (Jansen et al., 2008), but age differences in recall of prognostic
statistics specifically have yet to be examined.
The current study also held prognosis constant across conditions. It would be
interesting to vary prognosis in future experimental studies, because recent research
indicates that worse prognosis is associated with poorer recall of prognostic information
(Jansen et al., 2008), and information preferences appear to fluctuate at more advanced
stages of cancer, compared with early stage cancer (Hagerty et al., 2005). These
differences could influence both comprehension and distress following diagnostic and
prognostic consultations.
General Discussion and Implications
The results from this study contribute to a growing body of literature exploring
optimal approaches for communicating bad news in health care. Specifically, the findings
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provide preliminary evidence that subtle communication strategies such as framing
prognosis in a certain way contribute to meaningful differences in the response to bad
news. Although bad news is by definition unpleasant for physicians to give and patients
to hear, these discussions are common in Western healthcare due to the belief that
patients have a right to know their own medical information. This ethical and legal
principle necessitates physician disclosure and patient understanding of even the most
upsetting information about both diagnosis and prognosis so that patients can make
informed medical decisions according to their preferences and values (Rodriguez et al.,
2008).
As important as honest and precise delivery of bad news is, however,
understanding should not be prioritized entirely at the expense of psychological wellbeing. A person’s level of emotional distress following the receipt of bad news should
also be considered, and efforts should be made to reduce anxiety and distress to whatever
extent possible without sacrificing the provision of truthful and accurate information.
Avoiding depression and maintaining good psychological functioning are important
treatment goals in and of themselves. Psychological outcomes such as anxiety and
depression, however, are also important when considering the long-term physical health
of patients. Depression and poor quality of life among patients with cancer have been
shown to be associated with worse physical health outcomes (Coates et al., 1992)
including greater 5-year risk of death (Watson, Haviland, Greer, Davidson & Bliss,
1999), although this finding is somewhat less clear in far advanced cancer (Cassileth,
Lusk, Miller, Brown & Miller, 1985; Glare, 2005). Furthermore, depressed individuals
have been shown to be more likely to report dissatisfaction with the doctor-patient
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relationship, which is in itself critical to the effective treatment of the patient (Arora,
2003). In short, to balance autonomy and beneficence, two principles highly valued in
American healthcare, physicians need more information about how sharing bad news
affects patients and whether particular communication strategies can enhance patient
understanding while minimizing distress.
Results from this study suggest that identifying such strategies is not a simple
task. Indeed, these results indicate that current guidelines based on expert consensus may
not achieve their intended effect. Although this does not imply that physicians should
abandon warning altogether, these results do call for further investigation of this
technique as well as related approaches such as warning of the possibility of impending
bad news. If the warning strategy truly has no effect—neither beneficial nor harmful—
then its use in communicating bad news is largely irrelevant. Physicians should at least be
made aware, however, of the evidence behind the strategies they choose to employ,
particularly if an alternative strategy exists that may be more effective in attaining the
desired result. For instance, the Bad News Response Model (Sweeny & Sheppard, 2007)
implies that reducing the shock and minimizing the distress associated with a cancer
diagnosis may be best achieved by warning of the possibility of bad news some time in
advance of the actual delivery that news, because it would allow a patient to mentally
“brace for the worst.”
The conclusions regarding framing prognostic information are similarly complex.
On the one hand, framing prognosis in terms of positive outcomes appears to reduce the
anxiety and negative affect individuals experience after hearing their prognosis.
Additionally, positive framing appears to support hope, a goal of care that is repeatedly
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identified as a priority by both patients and physicians (Baile et al., 2000; Barclay et al.,
2007; Clayton et al., 2008). Although these results appear to support describing prognosis
using a positive frame, one must keep in mind that the goal of a prognostic discussion is
typically to balance accurate knowledge with optimal psychological well-being.
Consequently, the trend toward reduced accuracy in recall after positive framing
complicates this recommendation. Furthermore, it is important to question whether
positive framing could lead to inflated optimism, thereby sacrificing understanding for
happiness. Such concerns are typically disregarded in the health behavior literature,
where message framing has traditionally been employed. In this field the chief objective
is to change health behavior (e.g., increase mammography compliance or encourage
smoking cessation) so the message frame that most effectively achieves this single goal
can be unconditionally recommended. For instance, because women are much more
likely to get a mammogram after hearing the risks of failing to detect cancer early (rather
than the benefits doing so), presenting arguments for mammography compliance in lossframed terms is clearly preferable, regardless of the effect it may have on other outcomes.
When conveying prognosis, however, the need to balance two different goals leads one to
question whether the elevated hopefulness produced by positive framing represents the
achievement of one goal (i.e., optimal well-being) at the expense of another (i.e., accurate
comprehension).
Given these considerations, this study seems to support indirectly the guideline
that physicians use mixed framing (i.e., explaining prognosis with both positive and
negative frames; National Breast Cancer Centre and National Cancer Control Initiative of
Australia, 2003). Research indicates this approach is used infrequently in practice
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(Rodriguez et al., 2008), and further research is needed to examine the effect of mixed
framing before it can be endorsed unconditionally. For instance, it remains an empirical
question whether mixed framing will mitigate the framing bias observed in this study or
whether the provision of opposing frames might actually reduce recall due to the
increased memory load (Jansen et al., 2008).
The conclusions and implications described here represent preliminary steps in
identifying evidence-based approaches for communicating bad news in health care.
Given the knowledge that framing influences perceptions of prognosis and initial
responses to bad news, future research could evaluate the effect of this strategy on other,
more distal outcomes such as treatment choice and relationship with the physician. It
would be good to know, for instance, whether the elevations in negative affect and
anxiety observed in the current study harm the rapport between patient and physician or
whether this distress would persist over time. Furthermore, would individuals tend to
choose more aggressive treatment after hearing their prognosis framed positively? These
clinical outcomes are important for the long-term care of the patient. Finally, there are
many additional communication strategies beyond warning and framing that have yet to
be explored empirically. Though communication is sometimes viewed as an art that
cannot be studied empirically, this study contradicts that belief and reinforces the need
for such empirical evaluation by showing that expert consensus and commonsense
expectations about the consequences of communication are not always correct. Though
individual differences in patient preferences and personalities preclude a one-size-fits-all
approach, the more evidence available about the effects of various strategies, the better
chance doctors will convey bad news in a way that is optimal for each patient.
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Appendix A. Vignettes
Videos A1 and A2 Vignette
Please imagine yourself in the following situation:
You have been feeling constipated and nauseated for the last couple of weeks. You also
have been having bad pains in your stomach, and recently, you have started noticing
some blood in the toilet after you go to the bathroom. At first you thought that you just
had a stomach bug and that it would go away, but after about 3 weeks of the same
symptoms, you decided to go to the doctor.
You first saw the doctor last week. After examining you very carefully and asking you a
lot of questions about your medical background and your symptoms, the doctor told you
that there were a couple of different things that could cause the symptoms you’re
describing, but that he would not know anything without doing further tests. At the
doctor’s recommendation, you had a colonoscopy the next day, which is a standard
screening test in which doctors look at the inside of your colon to see if anything
appeared abnormal. The doctors found a couple of polyps, which are abnormal growths
of tissue that people your age often have. He biopsied the polyps, which means he
removed some tissue and sent it to the lab to be examined under a microscope.
Today you are here to see the doctor for the second time to find out the results of the
biopsy.

Vignette A
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Videos B1 and B2 Vignette
Now please imagine the following scenario:
Since your last doctor’s appointment, you have had a CAT scan. You also had surgery.
The surgeon cut out the cancerous part of your colon, along with segments of normal
tissue on either side to be sure that no cancer was left behind. He then reconnected the
healthy sections of your colon back together. As part of the surgery, the surgeon also took
out several lymph nodes to see if the cancer has spread to them. Lymph nodes help you
fight infections. If there’s lymph node involvement, it means that your cancer is at a more
advanced stage, and you might need chemotherapy. The surgeon told you the he sent the
lymph nodes off to be examined with a microscope, and that that all the results would be
back in one week.
You are recovering from surgery well, and are not in any pain. You are seeing the doctor
today to get results from the CAT scan and the lymph node biopsy.

Vignette B
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Appendix B. Video Scripts
Video A1
Good to see you— I’m glad we could get together to discuss your test results today.
Let me review your history a little bit to be sure that we’re on the same page… When you
came in last week you told me that you had been feeling constipated and nauseated for a
couple of weeks. You also complained of stomach pains and said that you had noticed
some blood in your stool. Now, as I told you last week, there are a couple of different
things that can cause the symptoms you’re describing, which is why we arranged for you
to have some tests done.
So two days ago you had a colonoscopy, where we looked at the inside of your colon. We
did find a couple of polyps, which are those abnormal growths of tissue that many people
your age have. We biopsied the polyps, which means we removed some tissue and sent it
to the lab to be examined under a microscope.
OK, so it’s the results of the biopsy that we’re going to be discussing today.
I’m afraid I have bad news. [Pauses momentarily, making eye contact with patient.]
The biopsy of that tissue shows that you have colon cancer. [Pauses briefly.]
I’m sorry to have to tell you this. I want you to know that I’m going to be here to help
you through this. [Pauses again, making eye contact with patient.]
At this point we don’t know the extent, or stage, of your cancer. We need to do some
more tests, including a CAT scan, to find out whether the cancer has spread. This will
help us decide what treatments are going to be most helpful for you.
However, regardless of whether the cancer has spread, the first thing we’ll want to do is
schedule you for surgery to remove the part of your colon where the cancer is. As part of
the surgery, we’ll also look for any spread of the disease, which will involve taking out
some lymph nodes and checking them for cancer.
Again, I want you to know that I am here to help you through this. [Pause]. We’re going
to take this one step at a time, and I’m going to help you understand everything that’s
going on. So let’s take a few minutes and then see what questions I can answer for you.

Video A1
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Video A2
Good to see you— I’m glad we could get together to discuss your test results today.
Let me review your history a little bit to be sure that we’re on the same page… When you
came in last week you told me that you had been feeling constipated and nauseated for a
couple of weeks. You also complained of stomach pains and said that you had noticed
some blood in your stool. Now, as I told you last week, there are a couple of different
things that can cause the symptoms you’re describing, which is why we arranged for you
to have some tests done.
So two days ago you had a colonoscopy, where we looked at the inside of your colon. We
did find a couple of polyps, which are those abnormal growths of tissue that many people
your age have. We biopsied the polyps, which means we removed some tissue and sent it
to the lab to be examined under a microscope.
OK, so it’s the results of the biopsy that we’re going to be discussing today.
[No warning of bad news.] The biopsy of that tissue shows that you have colon cancer.
[Pauses briefly.]
I’m sorry to have to tell you this. I want you to know that I’m going to be here to help
you through this. [Pauses again, making eye contact with patient.]
At this point we don’t know the extent, or stage, of your cancer. We need to do some
more tests, including a CAT scan, to find out whether the cancer has spread. This will
help us decide what treatments are going to be most helpful for you.
However, regardless of whether the cancer has spread, the first thing we’ll want to do is
schedule you for surgery to remove the part of your colon where the cancer is. As part of
the surgery, we’ll also look for any spread of the disease, which will involve taking out
some lymph nodes and checking them for cancer.
Again, I want you to know that I am here to help you through this. [Pause]. We’re going
to take this one step at a time, and I’m going to help you understand everything that’s
going on. So let’s take a few minutes and then see what questions I can answer for you.

Video A2
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Video B1
Hi, it’s good to see you again. I’m glad to see that you’re recovering well from your
surgery. As I told you before, the surgery went just as planned, and they were able to
remove the portion of your colon where the cancer was without a problem.
Now I know you’ve been waiting to hear the results of the additional tests that we had
done, and I’d like to talk to you about those results today.
The CAT scan showed that the cancer has not spread to any other organs in your body,
but we did find that the cancer has spread into several of your lymph nodes. [Pauses
again.]
I’m so sorry to have to tell you this. [Pauses again, making eye contact with patient.]
Now, the two main questions that patients usually ask me about this diagnosis are
treatment and what to expect in the future. So let me talk a little bit about that.
As far as treatment, I’m going to recommend a course of chemotherapy. In addition to the
surgery, chemotherapy is designed to kill the remaining cancer cells. The combination of
surgery and chemotherapy is the most effective treatment we have for this type of cancer.
Fortunately, there’s about an 80% chance that you will remain cancer free after
treatment. In addition, I can tell you that about 65% of people who are your age
and have this disease will be alive in 5 years.
I want you to know that I am going to do whatever I can to help you through this.
[Pause]. Let’s take a few minutes and then see what questions you have.

Video B1
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Video B2
Hi, it’s good to see you again. I’m glad to see that you’re recovering well from your
surgery. As I told you before, the surgery went just as planned, and they were able to
remove the portion of your colon where the cancer was without a problem.
Now I know you’ve been waiting to hear the results of the additional tests that we had
done, and I’d like to talk to you about those results today.
The CAT scan showed that the cancer has not spread to any other organs in your body,
but we did find that the cancer has spread into several of your lymph nodes. [Pauses
again.]
I’m so sorry to have to tell you this. [Pauses again, making eye contact with patient.]
Now, the two main questions that patients usually ask me about this diagnosis are
treatment and what to expect in the future. So let me talk a little bit about that.
As far as treatment, I’m going to recommend a course of chemotherapy. In addition to the
surgery, chemotherapy is designed to kill the remaining cancer cells. The combination of
surgery and chemotherapy is the most effective treatment we have for this type of cancer.
Unfortunately, there’s about a 20% chance that your cancer will come back after
treatment. In addition, I can tell you that about 35% of people who are your age
and have this disease will die within 5 years.
I want you to know that I am going to do whatever I can to help you through this.
[Pause]. Let’s take a few minutes and then see what questions you have.
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Appendix C. Information Recall Questionnaire
Information Recall: Diagnosis Video (Video A)
PLEASE CIRCLE YES OR NO.
1. Did the doctor tell you that you have colon cancer?
YES
NO
2. Did the biopsy show the extent, or stage, of your cancer?
YES
NO
3. Has the cancer had spread to your lymph nodes?
YES
NO
4. Did the doctor recommend that you have some more tests done?
YES
NO
5. Did the doctor recommend that you start chemotherapy?
YES
NO
6. Did the doctor recommend that you have surgery to remove the part of your colon
where the cancer is?
YES
NO
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Appendix D. Hope Ratings Questionnaire
Hope Ratings: Prognosis Video (Video B)
Now we are interested in what you are thinking and feeling about the news you just
received from the doctor.

5. Please rate how hopeful you feel about each of the statements below using a number
between 0 and 100. (0 is not at all hopeful, and 100 is extremely hopeful).
Based on the news the doctor gave you, how hopeful are you that…

Hopefulness
(0-100)

a. You will live 1 year?
b. You will live 5 years?
c. You will live 10 years?
d. You will live longer than the doctor expects?
e. You will receive the treatment you need?
f. The cancer will never return after treatment?
g. You will remain independent after treatment?
h. Any pain or symptoms will be well controlled?
i. You will be well cared for and supported?

6. Overall, how hopeful do you feel about the future? (0 is not at all hopeful, and 100 is
extremely hopeful): ______

7. How would you rate the news you just received about what to expect in the future?
(0 is the worst news you could have possibly received, and 100 is the best news you could
have possibly received): ______
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